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Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and 
"Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of 
Constitutional Language 
FREDERICK SCHAUER* 
Commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's use of the "two-
level" theory of speech to place obscenity beyond the pale of the first 
amendment. They charge the Court with shirking the task of 
balancing first amendment values and the states' interests in 
regulating obscene material. Professor Schauer meets this criticism 
by examining the meaning of the word "speech" in the context of the 
purposes of the first amendment and the Constitution as a whole. He 
concludes that "speech" does not include a category. of obscenity' that 
performs the function of a surrogate sexual act and is lacking in 
communicative content. The Court's treatment of obscenity, he 
maintains, is properly aimed at the isolation of such a category of 
material and actually operates to safeguard speech at the fringes of 
the amendment's coverage. 
A colleague of mine has observed that the essence of constitutional 
criticism consists of being "kind to your colleagues and unkind to the 
Supreme Court."I Although critical academic commentary about judicial 
decisions performs a valuable function,2 there are times when such criticism is 
misplaced. The Supreme Court can be right and prevailing academic criticism 
can be wrong about the same substantive issue. One such issue is the Supreme 
Court's continued adherence to the "two-level" theory of speech in which 
obscenity is deemed not to be speech and thus not encompassed by the first 
amendment.3 The prevailing academic view is that such an approach is 
*Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. A.B. 1967; 
M.B.A. 1968, Dartmouth; J.D. 1972, Harvard. 
Earlier versions of this article have been presented in lectures at Cambridge University, the University 
of Nottingham, University College, Cork, and to the British Committee on Obscenity and Film 
Censorship. This version has benefited greatly from the comments and questions of those who have listened 
to these earlier presentations. I am also indebted to those with whom I have discussed in depth the basic 
themes ofthis article, especially Tom Collins, Patrick Elias, Mary Jane Morrison, Paul O'Higgins, Bernard 
Williams, and Glanville Williams. Without the incisive questioning of these people I would never have been 
able to refine my ideas to the present state. What errors and omissions remain are solely my own 
responsibility. 
I owe a particular debt to William Van Alstyne, who provided detailed and insightful commentary on 
an earlier draft of this manuscript. The final product owes much to his forceful criticism, and I have 
benefited greatly from the necessity of responding to his arguments and critical evaluation. Nothing in the 
foregoing two sentences should be taken to indicate that Professor Van Alstyne agrees with any of the 
arguments in this final version. 
I. Remarks of Professor Doug Rendleman (unpublished). Criticism in constitutional law is particularly 
noted for its "savagery." Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 698 (1974). 
2. See Kurland, Preface, 1960 SUP. cr. REV. vii. 
3. The label "two-level" theory of speech was first used by Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of 
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intellectually dishonest because it manipulates words in order to avoid the 
more difficult problem of balancing first amendment values against the state's 
asserted interests in regulating obscene material.4 But this criticism miscon-
strues the philosophical underpinnings of the non-speech5 approach and is 
itself disingenuous in assuming that the definition of the word "speech" is the 
same in constitutional language as in ordinary discourse. 6 An examination of 
the purpose and interpretation of constitutional language leads to a clearer 
understanding of the analytical basis for the Court's approach to the 
particular issue of obscenity. Such analysis reveals that the Court's method is 
fundamentally sound and that it is the critics and not the Court that have 
failed to see the point. 
In order fully to understand the Court's approach to obscenity, it is 
necessary to ignore much of what the Court has said about its approach, and 
look instead at what it has done. 7 The Court has unwittingly encouraged 
criticism of its treatment by using language that is inconsistent with the 
method actually employed, s and by demonstrating either an unwillingness to 
Obscenity, 1960 SuP. Cr. REV. 1, 10. The late Professor Kalven has been credited with having "destroyed 
the intellectual foundations of the two-level theory." Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First 
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 30 (1975). A closer reading ofKalven's article, however, casts doubt 
on this assessment. By assuming that obscenity is speech, 1960 SUP. Cr. REV. at 3, Kalven fails to address 
the underlying premise of the two-level theory. Kalven would classify obscenity as "speech" under the first 
amendment and would insist on applying a balancing test to determine whether such speech is protected. 
The central proposition of the two-level theory and this article, however, is that some utterances are not 
speech at all, and that a balancing test need not be applied to exclude them from protection. Furthermore, 
Kalven admitted that a limitation oflegal "obscenity" to hardcore pornography might legitimate the two-
level approach. Id. at 13, 17, 25, 43. The Court has limited "obscenity" in this manner, thus rendering 
much of Kalven's criticism suspect. Kalven feared that the two-level theory would become a general 
method of first amendment analysis. Id. at 17. Although this has not in fact happened, his fear is a 
reasonable one. The non-speech approach is uniquely suited to the treatment ofhardcore pornography. But 
the fact that not all unprotected speech can be treated as non-speech does not render invalid an approach 
that treats some utterances as wholly outside the scope of the first amendment. The latter issue is the focus 
of this article but was not directly addressed by Kalven. 
4. See generally 1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 51-52, 398 (4th ed. 1976); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A 
GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 50-58 (1963); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1282-83 (9th ed. 1975); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 660·62 
(1978); Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing, 68 MICH. L. REV. 185 (1969); Kntz, 
Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 SUP. Cr. REV. 203, 211; Loewy, Free Speec/1: The 
"Missing Link" in the Law of Obscenity, 16J. PuB. L. 81 (1967); Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage 
of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127, 130-31 (1966); The Supreme Court, 1972 
Term, 87HARV. L. REV. 1, 160-75 (1973); Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALEL.J. 1364, 1401-05 
(1966). 
The preeminent philosophical justification for the Court's approach is Finnis, "Reason and Passion": 
The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222 (1967), an article to 
which I am heavily indebted. 
5. The term "non-speech" appears in N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, supra note 4, at 52. 
6. See, e.g., H. POLLACK & A. SMITH, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 79 
(1978) ("Despite the Court's semantic gymnastics, obscenity is speech. Wishing won't make it so, and no 
matter how many times the Court says that pornography is non-speech, in the real world it is speech 
.•.. "); L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 661; Shiffren, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment 
Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 915, 944 (1978). 
7. Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional Issue-What is Obscene?, 7 
UTAH L. REV. 289, 292 (1961) (most dependable guide to Court's treatment of obscenity is what it has 
done, not said). 
8. See text accompanying notes 123-84 infra. 
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treat thoroughly the implications of the non-speech approach or a failure to 
perceive the full range of those implications. 
The resulting inadequacies of the Court's articulation make it appropriate 
at this point to set aside the prevailing definition of obscenity, stated in Miller 
v. California9 and elaborated in subsequent cases.IO It is of course imperative 
that the definition employed be consistent with the underlying analytical 
structure, but deficiencies in the definition need not necessarily reflect 
deficiencies in the distinctions the defmition is intended to embody. In order 
to clarify the problem, it is best to ignore for now the substance of the 
definition and focus instead on what the Court's defmition of obscenity is 
designed to accomplish in the context of the non-speech methodology. 
After excluding any consideration of the Supreme Court's language or its 
test for obscenity, the remaining analytical skeleton can be formulated in the 
following manner: 
There is a category of pictorial or linguistic conduct (legal obsceni-
ty) that is not speech. Because it is not speech, it is not among the 
activities within the scope of the first amendment. Thus, the 
9. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller test for obscenity is as follows: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, ... (b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value. 
I d. at 24. It is not the purpose of this article to analyze every aspect of this test. For further analysis of this 
question, see F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 69-168 (1976). 
10. In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), the Court noted that while Miller approved instructions 
to juries that they apply standards of a hypothetical statewide community in obscenity cases, such 
instructions need not specify what community was appropriate nor require application of a "national 
standard." Id. at 157. Furthermore, even though questions of appeal to the prurient interest or of patent 
offensiveness are questions of fact, the Court found that Miller permitted jury discretion to determine what 
was patently offensive subject to the independent review of constitutional claims by appellate courts. I d. at 
160. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), the Court stated that although distributors of 
allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the various federal 
judicial districts into which they transmit the materials, the federal statute is not unconstitutional because 
of the failure of application of uniform standards of obscenity. I d. at 106. The Court reaffirmed its decision 
in Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1966), that in measuring the prurient appeal of allegedly 
obscene materials, consideration may be given to the prurient appeal of the material to clearly defined 
deviant sexual groups. 418 U.S. at 128. Moreover, the Court cited with approval Ginzberg v. United States, 
383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966), which held that evidence of pandering could be relevant in the determination of 
the obscenity of the materials at issue, as long as the proper constitutional definition of obscenity is applied. 
418 U.S. at 130. In Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), the Court found that the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment precludes retroactive application of the Miller standards to illegal conduct 
occurring before Miller but tried subsequent thereto if those standards would impose criminal liability for 
conduct not punishable before Miller. Id. at 191; see id. at 196-97 (reaffirming Hamling v. United States, 
418 U.S. at 102). The Court in Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977), held that the state statutory 
definition of community standards for appeal to the prurient interest and patent offensiveness was relevant 
but not conclusive on the issue of the standards to be applied in a federal prosecution. Id. at 307-08. Later 
the same year, the Court rejected a claim that a state statute was overbroad because it failed to state 
specifically the kinds of sexual conduct proscribed; the statute's apparent adoption of the Miller 
explanatory examples gave substantive meaning to the statutory provisions. I d. at 775. Finally, in Pinkus v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978), the Court held that children may not be included as members of the 
community for purposes of determining the effect of obscenity on the "average person." Id. at 297. 
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regulation of such conduct is not subject to first amendment 
standards of scrutiny.l1 
Analysis of the Court's approach breaks down into a three-step evaluation. 
First, is it possible to construct a theoretical or philosophical foundation for a 
category of non-speech consistent with basic first amendment values? Second, 
does some or all pornographic material fall within that category? Third, does 
the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity properly describe such a catego-
ry? 
I. "SPEECH" AS A TERM OF ART 
A. THE NEED TO DEFINE 
Assuming that there is no meaningful distinction between "speech" and 
"press" in obscenity law analysis, 12 the relevant text of the first amendment 
reads "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech 
.... "13 Some definition of the word "speech " is unavoidable. The first 
amendment does not say that Congress shall make no law abridging the 
freedom of action, the freedom of contract, the freedom to sell heroin, or the 
freedom to fly a kite. The first amendment is 'not a total prohibition of 
governmental action, nor can it sensibly be taken to apply the same burden of 
justification to all governmental regulation. Implicit in the first amendment is 
the notion that there is on the one hand a general standard of justification for 
governmental action, and on the other hand a higher standard when speech is 
the object of the regulation.14 Considerations that would be sufficient to 
justify official action not constrained by a specific constitutional prohibition 
may be insufficient to justify restrictions on speech. The first amendment 
protects speech even though it may produce consequences that could be 
regulated constitutionally if those consequences were caused by conduct other 
than speech.15 In order that the first amendment be applied effectively to 
11. This formulation is derived primarily from Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). This basic 
analytical structure is assumed rather than discussed in the Court's other obscenity opinions. 
12. Whether the press clause grants protection beyond that granted by the speech clause has been the 
subject of a rapidly burgeoning literature. See generally Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under tlte First 
Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205 (1976); Lange, Tlte Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
77 (1975); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of 
Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Nimmer, Speech and Press: A Brief Reply, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 120 
(1975); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 
TEXAS L. REV. 199 (1976); Shiffrin, supra note 6; Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); 
Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred Position," 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977). 
The type of sexually descriptive material generally at issue in litigation is of such a nature that the question 
of any distinction between speech and the institutional press is likely never to arise. In those cases in which 
material in the press has been charged with being obscene, the material has been found clearly nonobscene 
without any reference to special press protection. See Bucolo v. Florida, 421 U.S. 927 (1975), enforced s11b 
nom. Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972). 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
14. Such a distinction is indeed inherent in the concept of a "right." SeeR. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 190-91 (1977). This distinction is implicitly embodied in United States v. Carolene Products, 
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). . 
15. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 204 (1972) ("There will be 
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carve out a category of activity for special protection, consideration must be 
given to the meaning of the word "speech" as used in the first amendment. 
The point here is not that it is necessary to adopt a "definitional," 
"definitional balancing," or "categorization" approach to first amendment 
analysis. Rather it is that some definition of the word "speech" is required 
under any approach to first amendment methodology simply to delimit the 
scope of the constitutional protection. 
Definitions are particularly important in the context of the "literalist" 
method of first amendment analysis, a method that frequently leads to an 
"absolutist" view of first amendment protection.16 But absolute in force is not 
the same as unlimited in range or scope.17 A principle or a right can be 
absolute when applied without being applicable to every situation. Even the 
staunchest literalist or absolutist would laugh if a defendant in a prosecution 
for murder, rape, speeding, or litteringts raised the first amendment as a 
defense. These activities are not covered by the first amendment because they 
are not speech. They are outside the range of activities to which the first 
amendment applies. If a defendant in a murder case raised the first 
amendment as a defense to a prosecution for disintegrating the victim with a 
twelve-gauge shotgun, our response would not be that prosecution is per-
mitted because there is a ·clear and present danger"t9 or a "compelling state 
interest, "20 but instead that such standards are applicable if and only if the 
activities concerned are in fact speech. The rigorous standard of review, 
imposing a heavier burden of governmental justification, applies only to 
government regulation of human activity described as "speech" in the 
constitutional sense. 
One method that adds a measure of sophistication to the literalist or 
absolutist approach is referred to as "definitional balancing."2t This method 
also recognizes that the force and scope of a right are, or should be, distinct,22 
and that the difficulties associated with balancing first amendment interests 
cases where protected acts are held to be immune from restriction despite the fact that they have as 
consequences harms that would normally be sufficient to justify the imposition of legal sanctions."). 
16. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (19.61) (Black, J., dissenting) (first 
amendment rights cannot be "balanced" because object of adopting amendment was to put freedoms 
protected therein completely beyond congressional control); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143-
44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (Bill of Rights means what it says and court must enforce that meaning; 
balancing by court improper); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(first amendment prohibition in terms absolute; designed to preclude courts as well as legislatures from 
weighing values of speech against silence). See generally DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the 
Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 161, 182-86 (1972). 
17. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 260-61 (the more limited the range of a principle, the more 
plausibly it may be said to be absolute). 
18. Assume the crime consisted of discarding an apple core, not a political leaflet. 
19. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). · 
20. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). The compelling state interest standard in effect 
established the same strict scrutiny, or heavy burden of justification, that is implicit in the clear and present 
danger test. 
21. See generally, T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 494 (1970); DuVal, supra 
note 16, at 178-82; Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Nimmer, The 
Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 
CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968); Kauper, Book Review, 58 MICH L. REV. 619 (1960). 
22. SeeR. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 260-61; Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: 
Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. Cr. REV. 267, 278-309. 
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against other interests are best avoided by focusing on the scope of a right, 
and mandating absolute protection within that scope.23 Hence the focus here 
is on defining the limits of the first amendment, on describing the conduct 
covered by the first amendment, and on distinguishing such conduct from 
that outside the reach or range of the first amendment. Balancing is required 
in order to determine which activities are reached by the first amendment.24 
Thomas Emerson's treatment set the boundary between expression and 
action;2s Alexander Meiklejohn and others deemed politicaJ26 or (later) public 
speech27 to be the relevant category. Just like the literalists or absolutists, 
those committed to categorization cannot avoid some definition of the word 
"speech." 
Ad hoc or particularized balancing, in the tradition of Justice Frankfurt-
er,2s involves weighing the free speech interests involved in a particular case 
against other countervailing interests, such as the public or state interests in 
order and security and the interests in deferring to legislative judgment.29 
Although it is common to think of defming and balancing as opposing 
techniques of first amendment analysis,3o this is an oversimplification. 
Definers balance, albeit at a different level of particularity,31 and balancers 
defme. Take again the case of the "routine" murder. If the defendant argues 
that the interests protected by the first amendment ought to be balanced 
23. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 913-15 (1963); 
Frantz, supra note 21, at 1434-36. 
24. Emerson, supra note 23, at 915; Frantz, supra note 21, at 1434; Kauper, supra note 21, at 626. 
25. T. EMERSON, supra note 21, at 292-98; Emerson, supra note 23, at 917-55. The fundamental flaw in 
Professor Emerson's argument is that the expression/action distinction is almost wholly conclusory. The 
speech he labels expression is not fundamentally distinguishable from the speech he labels action, especially 
since in many troublesome cases it is impossible to separate the expression from the action. See Ely, Flag 
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 
HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1494-96 (1975). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 579. 
26. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). For additional 
commentary on the Meiklejohn theory see Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme 
Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 41, 72-77 (1974); Brennan, The Supreme Court 
and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965); Shiffrin, supra note 
6, at 917-21; Chaffee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REv. 891 (1949). Other commentators have shared 
Meiklejohn's view that the first amendment protects political speech. See, e.g., BeVier, The First 
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 
299 (1978) (need to protect political speech fully may justify courts' extending first amendment protection 
to other categories of speech); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1, 26 (1971) (explicitly and predominantly political speech is only form of speech that principled judge can 
prefer to other claimed freedoms); Scanlon, supra note 15, at 222 (right of individual to maintain certain 
beliefs and make informed decisions precludes government from controlling sources of information 
necessary to those beliefs). 
27. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. Cr. REV. 245. 
28. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519-56 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (absolute rules lead to absolute exceptions which corrode rules). 
29. Id. at 552. 
30. Compare Frantz, supra note 21, at 1449 (balancing test does not permit first amendment to perform 
function as constitutional limitation; virtually converts amendment into its opposite) with Mendelson, On 
the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 821 (1962) 
(language of first amendment ambiguous; ambiguity compounded by history). 
31. See generally Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing 
Test, 76 HARV. L. REv. 755 (1963) (Court's role is to balance "interests," which represent appeals to broad 
scheme of justification, and to exert "managerial competence" to determine constitutional allocation of 
competence to parties before it). 
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against the state's interest in punishing murder, the proper response is that 
there are no free speech interests to be balanced. No such interests exist either 
because murder is not speech, or because protection of murder is not within 
the ultimate goals of the principle of freedom of speech. The relevant inquiry 
is what activities call forth the application of first amendment principles. 
Defining the range of activities that require a fust amendment analysis is 
essential to balancing as well as to any other approach. No matter what 
approach is taken, some definition of speech that will give the fust amend-
ment discrete application and meaning is required. 
B. THE SOURCE OF THE DEFINITION 
Establishing that a definition of the word "speech" is necessary is merely 
the first step in the analysis. What must follow is the more important and 
more difficult process of determining how to defme "speech." Showing that it 
is necessary to defme "speech" will have been a wasted exercise unless we can 
ascertain a method for the defmitional process and a source for the defmition. 
Alluringly uncomplicated is the proposition that the words of the Constitu-
tion, such as "speech," can and should be interpreted as ordinary language, 
having substantially the same meaning in constitutional text as they do in 
everyday discourse.32 Those adopting such a view criticize the Supreme 
Court's obscenity decisions for ignoring the obvious. If pornography is a form 
of speech, according to the dictionary or according to ordinary usage, 
pornography must be a form of speech for first amendment purposes. 
If, however, ordinary usage supplies us with the defmition of the word 
"speech," then what excludes from first amendment coverage33 the many 
other activities that plainly are speech as the word is ordinarily used? Petjury 
is speech, conspiracy is speech, oral or written fraud is speech, verbally 
describing military secrets to an enemy is speech, and calling a bookie to place 
a bet is speech. Yet none of these activities has been held to be within the 
scope of the fust amendment.34 It is especially important here to distinguish 
between activities that are within the scope of the first amendment and those 
that are not, and at the same time to distinguish between coverage and 
protection.35 Under Justice Holmes' analysis, falsely shouting fire in a 
32. See note 6 supra. 
33. Coverage is not the same as protection. If an activity is covered by the first amendment, regulation of 
that activity is evaluated in light of the heightened standard of review required by the first amendment. If 
the state cannot meet the burden of showing a very strong governmental interest in regulating covered 
activity, that activity is protected as well. But if the state can put forth a justification that withstands strict 
scrutiny, the activity is not protected even though it is covered. 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 181 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Speech thought to promote a 
criminal scheme ..• is hardly within the ambit of the First Amendment."); Bangor & Aroostock R.R. Co. 
v. ICC, 574 F.2d 1096, 1107 (1st Cir. 1978) (fir.;t amendment does not limit regulation in areas of extensive 
economic supervision where exchange of information among firms possible vital element in illegal scheme); 
United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1978) (federal regulation proscribing threatening and 
harrassing telephone call not violative of first amendment); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 623-24 
(8th Cir. 1978) (speech advocating tax fraud not entitled to first amendment protection); United States v. 
Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 591-92 (2d Cir.) (communication to foreign government of secret material 
connected with national defense not free speech under first amendment), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952). 
Were it otherwise, every conspiracy case, every aiding and abetting case, and almost every antitrust case, 
among others, would be a first amendment case. 
35. See note 33 supra. 
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crowded theater is within the scope of the first amendment, but is not 
protected because even first amendment speech that causes a clear and 
present danger may be regulated.36 Similarly, public speeches that incite 
immediate violence are covered by the first amendment, but can be regulated 
only if the state can show the compelling interest that is implicit in the current 
"incitement" formulation of the clear and present danger standard.37 But the 
compelling state interest analysis has not been applied to the earlier examples. 
Perjury may be prosecuted without any showing of clear and present danger, 
and so may a conspiracy, a verbal bet, or verbal fraud. To illustrate: a person 
orally describes harmless military secrets to the enemy in such a way that the 
enemy's reliance on those secrets has the actual effect of hurting the enemy. 
In a prosecution for treason or espionage, the lack of potentially harmful 
effects would not be a defense.38 Yet in Brandenburg v. Ohio39 and Hess v. 
Indiana,40 the lack of violent or harmful effects is treated as relevant if not 
dispositive on the issue of incitement. 41 Certain uses of words, although 
speech in the ordinary sense, clearly are not speech in the constitutional sense, 
and thus do not require a governmental showing of harm or allow a defense of 
harmlessness. 
The ordinary meaning of the word "speech" is thus constitutionally 
overinclusive. It should not come as a surprise that the term "speech" as 
commonly used is underinclusive as well. The wearing of an armband in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 42 the wearing of a military 
uniform while performing a skit in Schacht v. United States, 43 and the 
improper use of the flag in Spence v. Washington44 are symbolic activities that 
one would not, but for the first amendment, think of as speech. 45 This· dual 
36. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
37. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (words not intended or likely to produce imminent 
disorder cannot be proscribed on ground that they had tendency to lead to violence); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (state cannot proscribe advocacy of use of force or of violation of law except when 
such advocacy directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (political hyperbole not a threat to incite 
violence). See generally Strong, Fifty Years of 'Clear and Present Danger': From Schenck to Bran· 
denburg-and Beyond, 1969 SuP. Cr. REV. 41; Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Speech Test for All 
Seasons, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 151 (1975). 
38. See Kamakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 738 (1952) (defendant charged with cruelty to 
American prisoners; defendant's limited contribution to enemy war effort not fatal to treason verdict); 
Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 941 (1st Cir. 1948) (affirming treason conviction for ineffective 
psychological warfare broadcast to United States). 
39. 395 u.s. 444 (1969). 
40. 414 u.s. 105 (1973). 
41. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 447 (state may proscribe only advocacy intended and likely to 
produce imminent lawless action); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. at 109 (regulated speech must be intended or 
likely to produce imminent disorder; cannot be proscribed because possessed tendency to lead to violence). 
42. 393 u.s. 503 (1969). 
43. 398 u.s. 58 (1970). 
44. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). 
45. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (per curiam) (display of flag upside down with 
peace symbols affixed to both sides constituted speech protected by first amendment); Schacht v. United 
States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970) (wearing military uniform in skit protesting participation in Vietnam 
protected by freedom of speech clause); Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 
(1969) (wearing armband to protest government policy in Vietnam was symbolic act protected by first 
amendment). 
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phenomenon of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness gives "speech" a 
vastly different meaning in the first amendment context than it possesses in 
ordinary usage. Accordingly, even if a consensus as to the ordinary meaning 
of the word "speech" existed, the coverage of the first amendment could not 
be determined simply by reference to that meaning. 
The fact that courts have excluded a wide range of verbal acts from the 
coverage of the first amendment does not mean that they were right in so 
doing.46 An alternative methodology would treat all verbal acts, including 
verbal betting, perjury, price-fixing, and oral delivery of military secrets to the 
enemy, as first amendment speech, although not necessarily protected speech. 
Such a theory seems unworkable, however, if we assume that first amendment 
theory must by some means allow the prosecution of such activities. If 
prosecution can occur only if each of these activities involves a clear and 
present danger, the next question is "clear and present danger of what?" The 
dangers involved in many of these activities are less substantial than the 
dangers of imminent physical violence47 or grave harm to national security.4s 
If the clear and present danger test is applied to justify prosecution of verbal 
betting or price-fixing or soliciting for prostitution, the Brandeis gloss that 
requires an evil to be of a certain magnitude as well as of a degree of 
imminence is effectively nullified.49 By the same token, incitement to littering 
would be unprotected by the first amendment. Such a weakening of the clear 
and present danger test would result in far less protection of speech, certainly 
of the kind of speech we consider most important. 
A second alternative would be to maintain that all uses of words are 
covered by the first amendment, but that some categories of utterances are 
protected to a lesser degree than others. This approach, however, does not 
succeed in confming the meaning of "speech" to its ordinary usage. The 
decision to give some categories of utterance slight protection is functionally 
the same as the decision to exclude these categories totally from the coverage 
of the first amendment. It is difficult to justify a first amendment theory that 
treats a verbal bet as less subject to regulation than the operation of a one-
armed bandit. Moreover, as the law creates new categories of weak protec-
tion, it diminishes the overall protection of speech in the same way that it 
lessens protection by restricting defmitional coverage. so If we take the word 
For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions in the symbolic speech area, see generally Alfange, Free 
Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 SuP. Cr. REV. 1; Ely, supra note 25; 
Henkin, Forward: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 76-82 (1968); Nimmer, The Meaning of 
Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 29 (1973); Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 
COLUM. L. REV. 1091 (1968). 
46. I am grateful to William Van Alstyne for providing the challenge that provoked this and the 
following paragraph. 
47. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (first amendment permits proscription of 
advocacy of criminal syndicalism only if such advocacy was "directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action"). 
48. See Schenck v.United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (question is whether words used in such 
circumstance to create clear and present danger that they will cause substantive evils that Congress has 
right to prevent, such as obstruction of recruiting service). 
49. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("This Court has not yet 
fixed the standard by which to determine when a danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may 
be and yet be deemed present; and what degree of evil shall be deemed sufficiently substantial to justify 
resort to abridgment of free speech .... "). 
50. Indeed, new categories are as likely to be categories of lesser protection. See FCC v. Pacifica 
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"speech" literally, it is inevitable that we must take the words "no law" less 
than literally. The dangers inherent in giving courts the power to define the 
word "speech" are less than those involved in granting power to decide how 
much restriction is allowed by the words "no law."SI At the heart of a 
defmitional approach to the first amendment is the idea that decreased 
pressure at the level of coverage is reflected in increased pressure at the level 
of protection. Ultimately, the argument of those who would narrow the scope 
of the first amendment is not for less protection, but for stringent protection 
of a more restricted area instead of weaker protection of a broader area. 
The foregoing comments should cause neither surprise nor alarm. It is 
foolish to suppose that a word can have a fixed meaning independent of the 
sentence in which it is used.s2 The word "good" means something very 
different in "He is a good person" than it does in "He is a good golfer."53 
Proper names alone designate a particular object or activity regardless of 
context or use. There are as many different meanings as there are different 
uses.s4 The word "shut" in "Is the door shut?", can have two divergent 
meanings depending on whether the purpose of shutting the door is to keep 
ants from getting in or a horse from getting out. Consequently, the word 
"speech" in the first amendment at the very least must draw its meaning from 
the sentence in which it appears. 
If context within a sentence can determine meaning, surely the broader 
context can also be relevant to this inquiry. The first amendment is contained 
in a Bill of Rights, which is in turn contained in a constitution. Constitutional 
language performs a unique function. The first amendment cannot be true or 
false. It neither describes a state of affairs nor communicates a proposition. 
Nor is it primarily ascriptive, in the sense of ascribing responsibility for 
actions or events.ss Rather, constitutional language, like statutory language, is 
to a great extent regulatory and classificatory. The words of the Constitution 
regulate an activity-the permissible limits of state action-and they classify 
or delineate the conduct to which the regulation applies. The fact that 
constitutions restrict governments rather than individuals renders the ordi-
Foundation, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3037-38, 3039-41 (1978) ("indecent" language protected but lesser value than 
"exposition of ideas;" prohibition permissible if transmitted by "uniquely pervasive" medium "uniquely 
accessible to children"); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (society's 
interest in protection of nonobscene erotic films of lesser magnitude than interest in political debate; state 
may use regulatory classification based on content of films). 
51. A close look at the first amendment reveals that each clause is subject to a wide range of 
interpretations. Scholars may differ on the meaning of the word "abridging." Similarly, the clause "the 
freedom of speech" may be weaker than "freedom of speech," which in tum may be weaker than "free 
speech." See generally Note, The Speech and Press Clause of the First Amendment as Ordinary Language, 
87 HARV. L. REv. 374, 382-84 (1973). Focusing on the word "speech" seems less capable of abuse or 
misapplication than the playing of linguistic or syntactical games with the remainder of the language of the 
first amendment. 
52. For further discussion of this well-established but not universally accepted philosophical premise, 
see J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1965); W.V.O. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960); 
B. RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH (1940). 
53. I have taken the liberty of Americanizing this example from B. WILLIAMS, MoRALITY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, 40-42 (1972), by changing "cricketer" to "golfer." 
54. The "meaning is use" theory implicit in this entire article is most often associated with the later 
Wittgenstein. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1953). 
See also Frankena, Some Aspects of Language, in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT & CULTURE 121-23 (P. Henle ed. 
1958). 
55. See Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PRoc. ARIST. Soc. (N.S.) 171 (1946). 
1979] SPEECH AND OBSCENITY 909 
nary meaning of the language less important than it would be in a criminal 
statute. A criminal statute requires communicative content in order to inform 
the general public of its strictures.56 Constitutional language restricts govern-
ment and not individuals and thus its communicative function is much less 
significant. Because language derives meaning from the purpose it serves and 
the function it performs,s7 the interpretation of constitutional language 
should be responsive to its special regulatory function-to restrict the scope 
of governmental action or power.ss 
"Speech" in the first amendment therefore must be defined with reference 
to the objective of that amendment, as a term of art, just as the technical 
language of architects or surgeons is defined by the fields in which it is used. 
The scope of first amendment protection is determined by the rationale 
underlying freedom of speech. The exclusion of a category of utterance from 
the meaning of the word "speech" is justified as long as the exclusion is 
consistent with that rationale. This does not mean that the ordinary definition 
of a word is never applicable in the constitutional context. Legal definitions 
and ordinary definitions of concrete objects frequently converge. For exam-
ple, if a constitutional amendment read: "Congress shall make no law 
concerning giraffes," the ordinary meaning of "giraffe" would define the 
object of the provision. Even concrete terms, however, may contain latent 
ambiguities. If the provision prohibited laws "concerning cats," the status of 
lions, tigers, and leopards would be in doubt.59 When the object of the 
provision is vague and ambiguous, as is "speech," the context and purpose 
become essential to interpretation. 60 
Difficulties in interpretation most frequently arise in dealing with fringe 
rather than core applications of language. 61 Widely accepted meanings 
constitute a core applicable in a variety of contexts. Although context and 
purpose are critically important at the fringes,62 the determination of what is 
56. On this point I am especially indebted to my student Mary Jane Morrison. 
57. See generally J.L. AUSI'IN, supra note 52; J. SEARLE, SPEECH Acrs: AN EssAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LANGUAGE (1969); Frankena, supra note 52; Ryle, Ordinary Language, in ORDINARY LANGUAGE 
(V.C. Chappell ed. 1964). 
58. This proposition frequently leads to the rejection of conventional modes of definition for legal 
purposes. See generally J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT ch. V (1776); Cohen & Hart, 
Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence, PRoc. ARIST. Soc., vel. 29 Supp. (1955); Hart, Analytical 
Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor Bodenheimer, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 953 
(1957); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 13-17 (1961); Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 
70 LAW Q. REV. 37 (1954); Summers, Legal Philosophy Today-An Introduction, in EsSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 1, 14 (R.Summers ed. 1968); Summers, Notes on Criticism in Legal Philosophy, in MORE 
EssAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 9 (R. Summers ed. 1971). A reasonably comprehensive summary of 
contemporary definitional theory in jurisprudence is contained in D. LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO 
JURISPRUDENCE 39-73 (3d ed. 1972). Support for the general proposition that language must be 
interpreted with reference to its function or purpose may be found in J.L. AUSI'IN, supra note 52; 
Frankena, supra note 54, at 134-38. 
59. Note the similarity with the concept of a latent ambiguity in contract law. See Raflles v. Wichelhaus, 
2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng.Rep. 375 (1864). 
60. I am not suggesting that the constitutional text itself serves no purpose, or that some constitutional 
provisions may not be more explicit than others. Rather I am asserting that the enormous range of human 
conduct that involves words indicates that the first amendment in general and the word "speech" in 
particular may be far less explicit than is often assumed. 
61. See generally Williams, Language and the Law-11, 61 LAW Q. REv. 179, 181-95 (1945). See also 
Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment; An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. 
REV. 263, 283 (1978) (similar concepts applied to defamation cases). 
62. Pornography, particularly pictorial pomography, is covered, if at all, only at the fringes of the first 
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at the core also may depend on context. A first amendment scholar on the 
street corner asked to give an example of speech might respond, "Standing on 
a soap box in Boston Common arguing that President Carter's anti-inflation 
measures are misguided." According to many first amendment theorists, this 
is the core meaning of speech. 63 A philosopher responding to the same request 
is likely to answer, "The cat is on the mat" or "Socrates is mortal." Thus even 
core meaning may vary with context; constitutional interpretation requires a 
functional, purposive, and contextual view of the definitional process. 
A full inquiry into function, purpose, and context of first amendment 
language reveals that the Court's decision to exclude obscenity from the scope 
of the first amendment is not the linguistic sleight-of-hand suggested by some 
commentators. 64 The Court's approach is grounded in good linguistic philoso-
phy-the recognition that the constitutional definition of speech need not 
parallel the definition of speech derived from other contexts and purposes. 
The fundamental question for the Court is whether obscenity is properly 
within the constitutional definition of speech. The answer to this critical 
question must be derived from the underlying philosophy of the first 
amendment. 65 It is to this question that I now turn. 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Because "speech" has a specialized constitutional definition, the term "two-
level theory of speech" is fundamentally misleading. The term suggests that 
the Supreme Court in Roth, Miller, and Paris has recognized two categories of 
utterance encompassed by the first amendment, only one of which is 
protected. This misconception results from a confusion of constitutional 
"speech" and ordinary "speech." Properly interpreted, the cases merely 
establish two categories of utterance-"speech" and non-speech. Some 
conduct is covered by the first amendment and some conduct simply is not; 
political criticism is clearly included and, equally clearly, murder is excluded. 
This approach assumes that some verbal or, as is often the case in the 
obscenity context, pictorial activity will not be covered. 66 The purpose of this 
section is to ascertain the boundary drawn by the Court between speech and 
non-speech As previously discussed, the boundary must be drawn with 
reference to the underlying purposes of the first amendment, and must 
distinguish conduct that the first amendment was designed to protect from 
the broader range of human activity. One must therefore ask: What activities 
amendment. 
63. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 
1964 SuP. Cr. REV. 191. There need not be only one core or central meaning. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 
579. Free speech may indeed be a bundle of interconnected concepts not susceptible to any single 
definition. This fact does not alter the proposition that the core or cores are determined by reference to the 
underlying theory of the first amendment. 
64. See notes 4 & 6 supra. 
65. It is tempting to maintain that the explicit language of the first amendment deprives the courts of 
power to formulate varying justifications for the first amendment. The exercise of such power is 
unavoidable, however, unless the first amendment protects every use of words to an equal extent. 
66. The vast majority of obscenity cases have involved pictorial materials, the notable exception being 
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 118-20 (1973) (plaincover, unillustrated book could be obscene). The 
few earlier cases involving verbal materials are noted in Kaplan, id. at 118 n.3. 
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should be protected by the first amendment? What is its underlying philoso-
phy? Only if the justifications for the first amendment lead to protection of 
obscenity is the Court's approach wrong. 
It is impossible within the scope of a single article to present a comprehen-
sive and critical survey of first amendment theory.67 Nor is it feasible to 
discuss exhaustively the various philosophical justifications for the concept of 
free speech. 68 But inasmuch as the boundaries of first amendment "speech" 
cannot be determined without a basic understanding of the purposes of this 
constitutional guarantee, some analysis of the various justifications and 
purposes is necessary. The objective of this analysis is not to determine the 
most appropriate justification for free speech, 69 but merely to identify a 
justification, if one exists, that is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
treatment of obscenity as non-speech. If there is such a justification, criticism 
should focus on that underlying rationale, rather than on the distinctions 
generated by it. 
The exclusion of obscenity from the scope of the first amendment is most 
illogical if one views the guarantee of individual freedom of action, freedom of 
choice, or individual self-expression as the fundamental purpose of the first 
amendment.1o If the aim of the first amendment is to allow a person to express 
himself, or determine his own life style, or to act in any manner that causes no 
harm to others, then an individual's right to the use of obscene materials as a 
form of self-expression or individualism is properly within the scope of the 
first amendment. 
The defect of the liberty theory is its treatment of freedom of speech and 
freedom of expression as synonymous terms. This treatment leads to confu-
sion, because "expression" has two rather divergent meanings. n "Expres-
sion" is frequently used to mean communication, requiring both a communi-
cator and a recipient of the communication. For example, if my new color 
television set insisted on presep.ting its offerings solely in black and white, I 
would express my dissatisfaction to the manager of the store where the 
television was purchased. "Expression" in this sense can easily be replaced 
67. A useful but abbreviated survey can be found in DuVal, supra note 16. For authorities reviewing 
particular first amendment theories, see note 69 infra. 
68. I am currently attempting such a task in a book tentatively entitled THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREE 
SPEECH. 
69. The existing literature on first amendment theory or free speech theory is almost exclusively devoted 
to arguments for a particular underlying justification for. freedom of speech. See generally A. 
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26; Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political 
Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173 (1956); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of 
Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964 (1978); BeVier, supra note 5; Bork supra note 26; Canavan, Freedom of 
Speech and Press: For What Purpose? 16 AM. J. JURIS. 95 (1971); DuVal supra note 16; Fuchs, Further 
Steps Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 347 (1976); Kalven, 
supra note 63; McCloskey, Liberty of Expression: Its Grounds and Limits, 13 INQUIRY 219 (1970); Morrow, 
Speech, Expression, and the Constitution, 85 ETHICS 235 (1975); Munro, Liberty of Expression: Its Grounds 
and Limits, 13 INQUIRY 238 (1970); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of 
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974); Scanlon supra note 15. 
70. The leading contemporary proponents of the liberty theory of the first amendment are Professors 
Tribe and Dworkin. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 576-736; R. DwoRKIN, supra note 14; Dworkin, 
Introduction, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 13-16 (R. Dworkin ed. 1977); Dworkin, The Rights of M.A. 
Farber: An Exchange, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, December 7, 1978, at 40 (responding to 
author of this article). See generally Baker, note 67 supra; Richards, note 69 supra. 
71. See generally Alston, Expressing, in PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 15-34 (M. Blacked. 1965) 
(distinguishes between expressing sentiment linguistically and evincing emotion physically). 
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with the word "communication" without any significant change of meaning. 
The word "expression" also can be used to mean self-expression-an activity 
not necessarily involving communication. I might express my anger or 
hostility toward the absence of color on my new color television set by 
throwing a paperweight at the screen. Thus "expression" can signify either 
communication, or external manifestation of inner feeling. The existence of 
these two meanings has created some confusion as to the object of first 
amendment protection. 
The confusion is compounded because communicating is one very impor-
tant way of "expressing oneself." Artists, poets, and writers express their own 
emotions, and at the same time communicate their ideas and emotions to 
viewers and readers. One who protested the Vietnam war by shouting 
obscenities at public officials was expressing his own anger and at the same 
time communicating disagreement with government policy to listeners. The 
major shortcoming of the liberty theory is its failure to analyze these forms of 
expression to determine which are consistent with the underlying justification 
for first amendment protection. 
If freedom of speech is in fact synonymous with freedom of expres-
sion-encompassing communication as well as other forms of self-expres-
sion-speech is virtually indistinguishable from other action. While commu-
nicative speech is undoubtedly a mode of self-expression, any activity may be 
a form of self-expression to the actor. Mode of dress is a form of self-
expression, as is hair length and style.n The same can be said of choice of 
residence or occupation. I may express myself in one way by driving a Pinto 
or a Buick, but in quite another by owning a Ferrari or an Hispano-Suiza. 
These examples emphasize that self-expression is a general concept that 
subtracts far more than it adds to any rational view of what free speech 
means. A theory that does not functionally distinguish speech from this vast 
range of other conduct reduces free speech to a general principle of liberty. 73 
72. In Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the regulation of hair length 
and style by a police department. The majority of lower court cases dealing with hair and clothing, mostly 
in the context of public school dress codes, have upheld the validity of such regulations. See L. TRIBE, 
supra note 4, ~t 958-65. 
73. Professors Tribe and Dworkin both seem to recognize this consequence of the liberty model, but 
appear untroubled by the implications. In fact, Professor Tribe uses freedom of speech, in part, to develop 
an expansive view of individual rights. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 899-990. Professor Dworkin finds 
essentially the same moral basis for freedom of speech as he finds for a wide range of other conduct, 
including the right to engage in private homosexual conduct and the right to use contraceptives. R. 
DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 275-76. 
Undoubtedly, excessive government intrusiveness disturbs most of us. Motivated in part by that fear, 
the drafters of the constitution established a limited government. It is tempting to try to stuff these values 
into the first amendment. Such values, however, have no legitimate role in justifying freedom of speech. 
Incorporating them into that concept can only arouse the same objections that were levelled against Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 "(1973). See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 
920, 927-28 (1973) (Constitution does not directly address abortion issue, nor can holding legitimately be 
inferred); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name-The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. Cr. REV. 
159, 167-85 (Roe definition of person derived from policy considerations, not from constitutional 
principle). Indeed, if the protection of self-expression· is to be found anywhere in the constitution, it is more 
likely to be encompassed by the due process clause or the ninth amendment. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Such an approach is less than satisfactory, but at least it is more honest in terms 
of what is being done. Thus, if the Court's holding in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-67 
(1973), that the state may constitutionally regulate the showing of adult films in public theatres, is wrong, it 
1979] SPEECH AND OBSCENITY 913 
This approach would extend first amendment protection to any of the above 
examples. If freedom of speech is coextensive with freedom of action, the 
government is no less free to regulate speech than it is to regulate any other 
form of human activity.74 If freedom of speech means freedom of self-
expression, then anyone who has conceded to limitations upon his freedom of 
action must pro tanto have conceded to limitations upon his freedom of 
speech. 75 Any meaningful conception of free speech must prohibit govern-
mental restriction of speech even if that speech causes conduct that could 
otherwise be regulated. 76 Without this distinction free speech is little more 
than a platitude. A justification for free speech that does not make this 
distinction, as the liberty model does not, deprives the principle of freedom of 
speech of all vitality. 
In any event, the key issue here is the Supreme Court's vision of the flrst 
amendment, not mine. It is clear from the obscenity cases and other recent 
decisions that the Court does not adhere to the liberty model. Notwithstand-
ing the Court's occasional use of "self-expression" language, 77 the first 
amendment has not been interpreted to permit any conduct that does not 
cause harm to others. 78 Even if self-expression is constitutionally important, it 
is only self-expression by communication that comes within the flrst amend-
is more likely wrong because of the dictates of the due process clause as discussed in Griswold than because 
of the first amendment. Such speculation, however, is beyond the scope of this article. 
A number of recent rulings appear on their face to weaken the argument that the Supreme Court's first 
amendment decisions are not based on the liberty model. In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977), 
for example, the Court held that the first amendment prohibits the state from requiring citizens to display a 
license plate motto that offends their moral, religious, and political beliefs. 
Wooley's prohibition of forced communication appears to safeguard individual self-expression, but the 
ruling may also be viewed as an attempt to protect against governmental interference with communication. 
See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (statute requiring newspapers to publish 
reply articles violates freedom of press); cf. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976) (private property 
owner need not provide nonowners access to forum of communication); Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and 
the Problem of State Action in First Amendment Adjudication, 61 MINN. L. REv. 433, 456 (1977) (same). 
The real constitutional harm in Wooley was not the action taken against the Maynards, but the fact of 
governmental interference with the communicative process. The two, although related, are distinct, 
especially if one views distrust of governmental regulation of communication, rather than more positive 
goals, as the basis of freedom of speech. In other words, it may be that the philosophical underpinnings of 
the first amendment derive not from any value particular to speech as compared to other activities, but 
from a governmental inability to regulate speech with the same care that is possible in other areas. Thus 
free speech emerges by negative implication rather than as a matter of positive moral right, even though the 
resulting legal consequences are the same in most cases. 
74. See Bork, supra note 26, at 25 (two benefits assigned to speech by Justice Brandeis-development of 
individual faculties and achievement of pleasure-do not distingnish speech from other forms of human 
activity; judge cannot choose to protect speech more than any other conduct on these justifications alone). 
75. Thus the real danger in equating free speech with personal liberty is in its reverse implication. I do 
not like to think that the rejection of libertarian political theory as a constitutional value (as in Paris)" 
should have any effect on the extent of freedom of speech. 
76. See Scanlon, supra note 15, at 204. 
77. See First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12, 783 (1978); id. at 805 (White, J., 
dissenting); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). 
78. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (obscene films not constitutionally 
protected simply because shown only to consenting adults); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. 
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (consensual homosexual relations between adult males not constitutionally 
protected), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See generally Hindes, Morality Enforcement Through the 
Criminal Law and the Modern Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 344 (1977); Perry, 
Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. L. REv. 417 (1976). 
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ment. 79 The mere fact that reading or viewing obscenity may be self-regarding 
is not sufficient to bring it within the definition of the word "speech." We 
must not put the cart before the horse. The fact that there may be no good 
reason for regulating obscenity does not ipso facto render it protected 
speech. so Harmlessness does no more to invoke the first amendment than 
murder, speeding, or the emission of sulphur dioxide.sl 
A similar but perhaps weaker theory fmds that free speech is essential to 
self-fulffilment and personal growth. s2 This argument stresses the uniqueness 
of human powers of reason and rationality, and accords special treatment to 
these qualities. If this theory is correct, it follows that the process of 
communication is particularly important. Communication informs us of the 
choices and hypotheses of others while allowing us to refine our own thoughts 
by articulating them. But the connection between communication and the full 
realization of the human potential, although seductively sensible, is logically 
incapable of generating an independent justification for freedom of speech. 
The fact that A may cause B, or even that A must cause B does not in any way 
lead to the conclusion that only A can cause B. There is no reason why X, Y, 
and Z cannot also cause B. Although communication may be a sufficient 
condition for intellectual self-fulfillment, it does not follow that it is a 
necessary condition. Self-fulfillment can also be obtained by a wide range of 
experiences, as opposed to ideas alone. Mental self-realization can be fostered 
by world travel, by keen observation, or by changing employment every year. 
Each of these experiences and many others can open one's eyes and trigger 
deeper thought and self-fulfillment. This model fails to indicate why commu-
nication is necessarily better than any of these other methods of "mind 
expansion." 
Even if we accept the proposition that communication is a necessary 
condition for this ideal state of mental development, it does not follow that it 
is also a sufficient condition. The value of communication in the development 
of reason is limited by the range of experiences that are the subject of the 
communication. Hayek has argued that the importance of freedom of thought 
and ideas is overestimated at the cost of underestimating the significance and 
value of actually doing things. 83 He maintains that new ideas often spring 
from new environments and experiences and that speech is merely the 
culmination of experience. Freedom of speech, therefore, is meaningful only 
79. It is clear in the cases mentioned above that the Court is using "self·expression" to mean only 
communication. See First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 783 (1978) (first amendment 
protects public access to discussion, debate, dissemination of information and ideas); Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (first amendment embodies commitment to uninhibited debate on 
public issues). 
80. The Court's obscenity decisions result in discrimination between "polite society and the hoi polloi." 
L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 669 n.81. But this has no impact on the initial determination of what is speech. 
The polite society is more likely than the hoi polloi to prefer books to the pool hall, and thus polite society 
may find that its pleasures are more protected by the constitution than those of the hoi polloi. But this does 
not make shooting pool speech. 
81. The philosophy of John Stuart Mill provides direct support for a libertarian position. According to 
Mill, society may act only to prevent activities causing harm to others. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 
413 U.S. 49, 68 n.14 (1973); Perry, supra note 77, at 433 n.106. But the issue is not whether Mill is wrong. 
Rather it is whether Mill's principles are contained in the concept of free speech. 
82. This view is most commonly associated with the theories of Professor Emerson, supra notes 21 & 23, 
but it has its origins in Aristotelian notions of the perfectability of man. 
83. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 33 (1960). 
1979] SPEECH AND OBSCENITY 915 
when freedom of action exists. 84 Although Hayek's thesis may not be relevant 
to some theories of freedom of speech, 85 it is especially helpful in this context. 
If our concern is with expansion of the mind, then choice, diversity, 
individuality, and novelty are clearly as important as communication in the 
whole range of human conduct. If the value of communication is dependent 
on what can be communicated, then the other forms of conduct are logically 
prior to and therefore more important than communication. 
Communication is nevertheless valuable as one aspect of an extremely 
broad Aristotelian concept of freedom of action. The use of this theory to 
justify freedom in the broad sense, however, has only limited utility as applied 
to freedom of speech. Freedom of speech under such a theory is merely a 
component of that general good often denominated freedom or liberty. To the 
extent that freedom in the general sense is interpreted expansively, freedom of 
speech is included pro tanto. To the extent that general liberty is limited, this 
thesis provides no reason why freedom of speech should not be subject to the 
same limitations. 86 Thus the argument generates no principle that justifies 
special protection for speech. The conclusion is the same as that reached when 
examining speech as self-expression. An argument for individual freedom 
may be derived from both theories, but neither presents an argument that 
demonstrates why freedom of speech is any more valuable than any other 
conduct. Without this distinction the discussion is limited to personal 
freedom in general, not freedom of speech, and without this distinction it is 
not possible to identify an underlying philosophy for the first amendment. 
Having discarded the view that freedom of speech is merely an undistin-
guishable subset of a broader notion of individual liberty, the main theories 
that compete for attention are the marketplace-of-ideas model,87long recog-
nized in first amendment jurisprudence, 88 and the democratic theory model 
most commonly associated with the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn. 89 
It should be recognized that these theories are not wholly or even 
substantially without defects. The marketplace model, based on the pragmatic 
84. Id. at 33-35. I suppose that it is possible to argue that the language of the first amendment 
commands that speech be treated differently, no matter the reason. I am not yet willing to attribute the 
magnificence of the first amendment to a fortuitous inconsistency. 
85. Hayek treats freedom of speech solely as an individual right of the speaker, rather than a right that 
benefits society as a whole. The latter is implicit in both the Meiklejohn interpretation and the marketplace 
theory. 
86. See note 75 supra. 
87. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (purpose of first amendment is to 
preserve uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail); DuVal, supra note 16, at 
188-94 (discussion of marketplace theory). 
88. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); IBEW Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d 
Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, 
J.). See generally Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some 
Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975). 
89. See notes 26 & 27 supra. See generally DuVal, supra note 16, at 194-98; G.C. FIELD, POLITICAL 
THEORY 132-40 (1956). Although the modem articulation of the theory is the product of Alexander 
Meiklejohn, the seeds are in fact found much earlier. See B. SPINOZA, TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-
PoLmCUS ch. XX (1670); D. HUME, Of the Liberty of th11 Press, in EsSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL AND 
LITERARY 8 (Oxford ed. 1963); cf. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1920) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (right of citizen to take part in making of federal laws and conduct of government necessarily 
includes right to speak or write about them). 
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epistemology of Justice Holmes,90 can be criticized by the observation that 
our moral senses have reached the point where the assumption that the best 
test of truth is the ability of an idea to command popular acceptance in an 
open interchange of competing views appears questionable.91 Slavery was not 
wise policy merely because it was accepted in many parts of the world, 
Nazism was not "correct" in Germany in the 1930's, and any prevailing 
American view is not automatically right solely because it is the product of a 
system characterized by freedom of discussion. Equally naive is the view that 
freedom of speech in fact leads to the identification of some objectively 
verifiable truth.92 Although such an assumption permeates the arguments of 
Milton,93 Locke94 Mill,95 and Jefferson,96 we have too often witnessed 
falsehood triumph over truth to have faith in the empirical proposition that 
truth always prevails.97 
The existence of defects, however, should not be allowed to obscure the 
value of the marketplace model. The real issue is whether popular selection 
among ideas arrives at truth more readily than governmental selection, not 
whether the marketplace of ideas always produces truth. History does 
support the proposition that, whatever the failings of popular choice among 
ideas, this method has proved superior to choice by public officials.9B In 
addition, one must not be misled by repeated references to "truth" in the 
literature of the marketplace of ideas. The real value in open discussion is not 
so much the discovery of truth as it is the identification of error.99 Maximizing 
90. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market •••• "); Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (same). 
91. See Auerbach, supra note 69, at 187 (criticizing Holmes; dangerous to define truth in terms of what 
marketplace has come to accept; experience may refute assumption that truth will "survive"). See generally 
M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 290 (1954). 
92. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, J.) (arriving 
at the right conclusion from "a multitude of tongues" more likely than through authoritarian selection); W. 
BAGEHOT, The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration, in 2 LITERARY STUDIES 422, 425 (3d ed. E.H. Hutton ed. 
1884). 
93. J. MILTON, AREOPAGmCA 78, 126 (J.C. Suffolk ed. 1968) ("[W]ho ever knew truth put to the 
worse, in a free and open encounter?"). 
94. J. LoCKE, A LETTER CoNCERNING TOLERATION 151 (J.W. Gough ed. 1948) ("For the truth 
certainly would do well enough if she were left to shift for herself."). 
95. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2, reprinted in EssENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 268-304 (M. 
Lerner ed. 1961). 
96. Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON (Padover ed. 1943) 
If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican 
form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may 
be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. 
Id. at 384-85. 
97. See Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 
YALE L.J. 1084, 1116 (1961); Auerbach, supra note 69, at 187. The idea that open discussion will lead to 
the truth is a product of the Enlightenment and the optimistic view of humanity's rationality that 
characterized that period and its philosophy. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 
Inc., 312 U.S. 287,293 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.). More contemporary insights into philosophy, psychology, 
and mass communications have properly cast doubts on these underlying assumptions. 
98. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519-56 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
99. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940); Auerbach, supra note 69, at 188; DuVal, note 16 
supra, at 205-06. 
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the possibility of challenge to accepted views increases the chances that error 
in received opinions will be exposed.tOO Although continued identification of 
error may not lead to truth, it can lead to an increase in knowledge. 101 
Reformulated, the marketplace model retains value as a first amendment 
theory. 
The Meiklejohn interpretation is simply a variant on the themes just 
expressed. Although Meiklejohn purported to reject the Holmesian market-
place model, 1o2 his writings apply the marketplace methodology to the 
democratic process. Holmes' holding that the best test of truth is the 
marketplace of ideas103 does not differ significantly from Meiklejohn's view 
that a democracy, by definition, considers acceptance by the populace after 
full and open discussion to be the test for political truth.104 When in his later 
writings Meiklejohn expanded his doctrine to include all issues of public 
importance-not only those that were explicitly political10s_the similarity 
between Meiklejohn's theories and the "survival" theory of truth 106 espoused 
100. Among the classical theorists, Mill is noted for focusing on the identification of error rather than 
the search for some absolute truth. Mill and others should not be criticized on the ground that their 
argument is flawed because there is no absolute truth. It is certainly possible to increase knowledge short of 
absolute certainty. See generally A. FLEW, AN INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 320-25 (1971). 
The argument from truth is better characterized as the argument from know lege, since the argument is not 
dependent on the existence of identifiable absolute truth. Although I may not be able to say with absolute 
certainty that the moon is not made out of green cheese, only the most resolute skeptic would deny that 
current theories regarding the composition of the moon are more likely to be true than the green cheese 
theory. The search for truth is a search for a more desirable epistemic state, not necessarily a search for 
absolute certainty. We must at least assume that there are certain things that we can know. The issue is who 
decides what information is available, and the argument from truth is based much more on skepticism 
about the ability of government to decide than on skepticism about knowledge in the abstract sense. See 
Feinberg, Limits to the Free Expression of Opinion, in J. FEINBERG & H. GROSS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 135 
(1975). 
There are serious risks involved in granting any mere man or group of men the power to draw 
the line between those opinions that are known infallibly to be true and those not so known, in 
order to ban expression of the former. Surely, if there is one thing that is not infallibly known, 
it is how to draw that line. 
Id. at 136-37 (emphasis in the original). 
101. The emphasis on identifying error is most often associated with the writings of Sir Karl Popper. 
See, e.g., K. POPPER, THE LoGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (3d ed. 1972); K. POPPER, CoNJECTURES 
AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (4th ed. 1972); K. POPPER, OBJECTIVE 
KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (1972). Popper applies his theory of the philosophy of 
science to social and political philosophy in THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966). The 
most prominent critic of Popper and Mill on open discussion and its advantages is Kendall, The "Open 
Society" and its Fallacies, 54 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 972 (1960). 
102. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-government, in POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE 
CoNSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE, at 42 (1960) ("The First Amendment was not written 
primarily for the protection of those intellectual aristocrats who pursue knowledge solely for the fun of the 
game, whose search for truth expresses nothing more than a private intellectual curiosity or an equally 
private delight and pride in mental achievement."). 
103. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes recognized 
that this theory was most applicable to political truth, and thus in a sense anticipated Meiklejohn. See 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
104. Meikeljohn, supra note 102, at 27. 
105. See Meiklejohn, supra note 27 at 255-57 (first amendment protects means by which citizens meet 
responsibility of making free judgment, including education, philosophy and sciences, literature and arts, 
and public discussion of public issues). 
106. See note 91 supra. 
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by Holmes became even more apparent. Meiklejohn's contribution to first 
amendment theory is a reasoned justification for giving some issues priority in 
the process of open discussion; the idea that the importance of open 
discussion and the importance of pointing out error in accepted views varies 
directly with the importance of the issues under discussion. to? 
Analysis of the preceding sample of philosophical views reveals that the 
protected activities share two main features. First, they are all communica-
tive. It has been suggested that freedom of speech, properly defined, is 
freedom of communication.tos Communication is not, however, a sufficient 
condition for first amendment protection. Perjury,to9 conspiracy, blackmail, 
threats,11o and verbal treason, while outside the scope of the first amendment, 
are all communicative. But communication is still a necessary condition for 
first amendment protection. Once individualism per se is excluded, any 
rational justification for the principle of free speech requires both a communi-
cator and an intended object of the communication.tll Justifications other 
than individualism or self-expression are based on the transmission or 
dissemination of information or ideas resulting in an increase in the number of 
people having access to a particular view. Because all these justifications are 
in some sense based on the free flow of factual information and normative 
propositions, it is at the very least a two-person process. If Paul Cohen wishes 
to vent his anger by shouting "Fuck the Draft!" in the middle of the Mojave 
Desert or on top of Mount Rainier, the first amendment should not protect 
his activity.m 
107. See Kauper, Book Review, 58 MICH. L. REV. 619, 624 (1960). 
108. See Henkin, supra note 45, at 79-80 (first amendment protects conduct that "communicates"); 
Morrow, supra note 69, at 236 (speech means deliberate communication of ideas, beliefs by "broadly 
linguistic" means). The Supreme Court frequently uses the word "communication," as in Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 19, 67 (1973). 
109. See Leflar, The Free-ness of Free Speech, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (1962). 
110. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (reversing per curiam, 402 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 
1968)). See generally Comment, United States v. Kelner: Threats and the First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. 
REV. 919 (1977). Although the use of threatening words may at times be protected political speech, the 
first amendment does not cover one who calls a private individual on the telephone and threatens physical 
harm. 
111. See Scanlon, supra note 15, at 206. Scanlon defines an act of expression as "any act that is intended 
by its agent to communicate to one or more persons some proposition or attitude" which would include 
"speech and publication • . . symbols • . . demonstrations, many musical performances, some bombings, 
assassinations, and self-immolations." Id. 
112. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Professor Dworkin argues that the fact that we protect 
the right of people to march where they are unwanted, see National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 
(1977) (per curiam) demonstrates that we are concerned as much if not more with the speaker than with 
the listener. Dworkin, The Rights of M. A. Farber: An Exchange, supra note 70, at 41. This argument 
ignores the fact that the particular venue for the march increases the communicative impact on those 
outside of that venue. More significantly, the real issue in Skokie is neither those particular marchers nor 
those particular listeners, but the danger of granting power to any government to decide among political 
utterances in any situation, a danger that would have a more harmful effect in other situations where there 
might be willing listeners. See Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955) (distinguishes 
between justifying general practice and justifying particular action falling within it). 
It is true that certain justifications of the first amendment, notably the liberty theory, focus on the 
interests of the speaker in voicing the protected communication. Cf. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 804, 807 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (one first amendment function is use of 
communication as means of "self-realization," "self-fulfillment"; amendment protects "communications 
emanating from individuals"; "[i]deas which are not a product of individual choice are entitled to less first 
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Furthermore, any justification for free speech requires that the category of 
the communication be in the public interest.m Only ifthere is some particular 
value in what is conveyed does it make sense to protect the process.114 
Although suspicion of our ability to determine which categories of speech 
have value is warranted,m this task is unavoidable unless the first amendment 
is to protect every conceivable use of language.II6 It is a mistake to say that 
the first amendment protects only political communication, but it is equally 
fallacious to say that the first amendment covers whatever one person may 
say to another. By defming "speech", an area of conduct is carved out for 
particular protection. The area should encompass that which has some value 
for society, not in terms of a particular proposition, but in terms of a category 
of propositions. The Skokie marchers are protected not because what they 
have to say is particularly valuable, but rather because the category of 
political utterances is deemed worthy of protection, and we have wisely 
chosen not to entrust to courts or other bodies the power to make value 
judgements within that category.m If there is a category of utterance that, as a 
whole, has no value in the context of the justifications underlying the first 
amendment, and if this category can be adequately identified, then such a 
category ought not to be within the scope of the first amendment. 
amendment protection."). Cohen is the prototype decision upholding the speaker's interest in voicing 
protest and expressing emotion. 403 U.S. at 25 ("one man's vulgarity is another's lyric"; Constitution 
protects individual taste and style largely because government cannot make principled distinctions in those 
areas). Other first amendment theories concentrate on the interests of the audience, the recipients of the 
communication. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (listener's interest is 
substantial; protected speech serves individual and societal interests in informed, reliable decisionmaking); 
Virginia St. •Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) 
(first amendment protection of free flow of drug price information is enjoyed by recipients of information 
and disseminators; right to communicate presupposes reciprocal right to receive communication). Supreme 
Court decisions in the area have also emphasized general societal interests in the free flow of 
communication. See First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776 ("The Constitution often 
protects interests broader than those of the party seeking vindication."; first amendment serves important 
societal interests); Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 
764-65 (society has strong interest in free flow of commercial information; first amendment is instrument to 
enlighten public decisionmaking). Much discussion has centered around this question of "the right to 
know," whether the first amendment focuses on the interests of speakers or hearers or society in general. 
See generally Symposium, The First Amendment and the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q.\1. That 
inquiry, however, is not directly relevant to this article. In every first amendment case, there has been a 
communicative act, involving both a speaker (or writer) and a hearer (or reader). No matter whose 
interests are viewed as paramount under a given justification of the first amendment, protected speech is 
distinguished by its content. See Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. at 756, 761 (freedom of speech presupposes willing speaker; protection extends to communication, 
source, and recipient; speech that lacks all first amendment protection must be distinguished by content). It 
is worthwhile to note that in general the self-expression theories are speaker-directed, and the "search for 
truth" and democratic process theories are hearer-directed. Even if the concern is directed at hearers or 
society at large, speakers that provide the ideas or information must be protected equally. 
113. See Morrow, supra note 69, at 237-38 (freedom of speech protects communication of public 
matters-policy, government, procedures, officials, education, social organization-including matters 
"necessary to prepare for political life, . . . that is, general intellectual and moral education"). 
114. See Canavan, supra note 69, at 96-99. 
115. See Schauer, The Return of Variable Obscenity?, 28 HASTINGS L.J.l275 (1977) (criticizing Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
116. See text accompanying notes 33-40supra. 
117. See note 112 supra. 
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III. Is OBSCENITY "SPEECH"? 
The question now is whether there can be a category of linguistic or 
pictorial conduct that serves no ftrst amendment purpose and thus is not 
within the constitutional definition of the word "speech." In particular, can 
some hardcore pornography,us or obscenity,119 comprise such a category? 
In Roth v. United States,12o and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,l2! the Court 
appears to suggest that utterances or other conduct that comprise "no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas"122 are not reached by the ftrst 
amendment. Unfortunately, precedent fails to supply examples of such "idea-
less" utterances. If an utterance exists that does not contain an idea, it was not 
the utterance in Chaplinskyl23 or Beauharnais v. Illinois, 124 and it is not clear 
whether it was the utterance in Roth since in that case the Court was not 
passing on the obscenity of speciftc materials.12s But the questionable origin of 
the idea-less concept does not alone render it invalid. There may be examples 
of idea-less utterances even if the Court failed to identify them. The core 
principle, detailed in the previous section, is that speech is protected not for 
what it is, but for what it does.'26 Speech is protected only because it contains 
certain properties. If there are utterances that do not serve the purposes for 
which speech is protected, or that do not contain the properties that justify 
the principle of free speech, there is no reason to place such utterances within 
the ambit of the ftrst amendment.127 The Court is saying that the communica-
tion of ideas is at once the essential ftrst amendment purpose and the essential 
ftrst amendment property. Without this purpose or property, activity is not 
118. By beginning with hardcore pornography, I anticipate my conclusion. The main defect of Rotl1 is 
that the Court repeatedly used the word "obscenity" without giving it any concrete definition. See 
generally Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 
MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960). I do not suggest that anything other than hardcore pornography can be outside 
the constitutional definition of the word "speech." 
119. The word "obscenity" should be entirely excluded from any discussion ofthis area of the law. It is 
"pornography" and not "obscenity" that is the focus of the non-speech approach that the Court has 
adopted. The reader should exclude any consideration of the ordinary use of the word "obscenity": 
For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral 
significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted which 
should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law. We should lose the fossil 
records of a good deal of history and the majesty got from ethical associations, but by ridding 
ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain very much in the clearness of our 
thought. 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1897). 
120. 354 u.s. 476 (1957). 
121. 315 u.s. 568 (1942). 
122. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72). 
123. 315 U.S. at 569. Calling a public official a "racketeer" and a "damned Fascist" contains an idea and 
a political idea at that. 
124. 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (group libel was not speech). The Court in Roth relied on Beauharnais as well 
as on Chaplinsky, 354 U.S. at 486-87. 
125. 354 U.S. at 496-98 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
126. Free speech is seen as an intrument of good, not as a good in itself. Although Professor Emerson, 
among others, considers free speech a good in itself, see Emerson, Communication and Freedom of 
Expression, SciENTIFIC AMERICAN, September, 1972, at 163, 164, he speaks rather loosely. To say that free 
speech promotes self-fulfillment and a realization of man's potential is not to say that it is simply good. 
127. On defining speech by its function, see H. LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF POLITICS 118-19 (4th ed. 1938). 
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protected by the first amendment. Even assuming the validity of the Court's 
articulation, there is no reason why this purpose or property must be found in 
every utterance. Because this purpose or property can be found in cases not 
involving verbal or pictorial activity, such as the symbolic speech cases, 12s it is 
by no means inconceivable that certain verbal or pictorial activity will not 
contain these qualities. Professor Henkin's observation about symbolic speech 
seems especially relevant here: There is "nothing intrinsically sacred about 
wagging the tongue or wielding a pen."129 
The Court's discussion of ideas, 130 however, is troubling. Language may 
serve many purposes other than the expression or communication ofideas,131 
and many of these purposes are clearly within the scope of the first 
amendment. To use language to arouse feelings or emotions, to induce 
someone to take action, to create a sense of beauty, to shock, to offend, or to 
ask a question is in each instance a use of language for some purpose other 
than the exposition of ideas. There are many instances in which this very type 
of linguistic activity falls well within the confmes of the first amendment.132 
For example, if! stand on a platform and say the word "God," I have uttered 
something that has conceptual content, m that is likely to encourage thought, 
even though my statement is in the strict sense nonpropositional. 
It follows from this that what the Court really had in mind, or should have 
had in mind, is the communication of a mental stimulus-an attempt by a 
speaker or writer or artist to influence his audience in a particular fashion. If 
this is what the Court meant by "expression of ideas," then art and 
entertainment no longer hinder the formulation of an ideational theory 
consistent with first amendment precedent.134 If art is thought to be commu-
nicative, a pictorial rather than linguistic way of conveying an idea, 135 art is 
128. See note 45 and accompanying text supra. 
129. Henkin, supra note 45, at 79. 
130. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 484-85; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 39, 67 (1973). 
131. See generally Frankena, supra note 54; Frankena, Cognitive and Noncognitive, in LANGUAGE, 
THOUGHT & CULTURE 146 (P. Henle ed. 1958). 
132. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (exhibiting "Puck the Draft" on jacket in 
courtroom protected by firSt amendment); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 498, 501 (1952) 
(conviction for exhibiting sacrilegious!f!lm reversed); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 508, 510 (1948) 
(conviction for possessing bloody detective stories with intent to sell overturned). 
133. Frankena, Cognitive and Noncognitive, supra note 131, at 146, uses the term "primary conceptual 
content." 
134. Criticism of possible exclusion of art and entertainment under Roth is clearly outlined in Richards, 
supra note 69, at 76-77. However Richards is enamored with the conception of "obscenity" as words or 
expressions designed to shock. He assumes that the exclusion oflegal obscenity from the first amendment is 
based on the same theory used to justify regulation of"obscenities," such as shocking words, and concludes 
that regulation of obscenity in any form is constitutionally impermissible under his moral theory of the first 
amendment, a theory derived in part from John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971). But the similarity 
between excluded legal "obscenity" and obscenity in the ordinary sense is more apparent than real. See 
note 118 supra. Thus Richards does not directly address the issue faced by the Court, although he would 
probably would disagree with the Court's position because he holds a libertarian rather than a 
communicative view of the first amendment. Richards, supra note 69, at 62. 
Richard's demonstration that not all protected speech is propositional and that therefore the 
nonpropositional nature of obscenity should not lead to its exclusion, id. at 76-77, also misconceives the 
issue. Legal· obscenity is excluded not because it is nonpropositional, but because it is nonmental-a 
fundamentally different concept. See text accompanying notes 134-50 infra. 
135. See generally N. GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART, AN APPROACH To A THEORY OF SYMBOLS 
(1968). 
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protected by the first amendment. But if, as some theories of aesthetics hold, 
art is not communicative, 136 then a theory of the first amendment that 
excludes material not a part of the exposition of ideas may exclude serious art 
and literature. If the Court's reference to "ideas" is taken with a grain of salt, 
however, the heart of the Roth analysis becomes the idea of cognitivet37 
content, of mental effect, of a communication designed to appeal to the 
intellectual process. This theory, which cannot be reduced to a single word 
without being burdened with unwieldy philosophical baggage, t3s would 
protect the artistic and the emotive as well as the propositional.l39 This 
cognitive content may not be a sufficient condition for first amendment 
protection, but the Court finds it a necessary condition. 
If the foregoing represents the deeper meaning of Roth, the exclusion of 
hardcore pornography, and hardcore pornography alone,t40 makes more 
sense. Implicit in the Court's reasoning is the notion that hardcore pornog-
raphy is designed to produce a purely physical effect.t4t The key to 
understanding the Court's treatment of pornography as non-speech is the 
realization that the primary purpose of pornography is to produce sexual 
excitement.t42 The distinction between the pornographic and the sexually 
explicit is completely artificial unless pornography is viewed as essentially a 
physical rather than a mental stimulus. 
Thus the refusal to treat pornography as speech is grounded in the 
assumption that the prototypical pornographic item on closer analysis shares 
more of the characteristics of sexual activity than of the communicative 
process.143 The pornographic item is in a real sense a sexual surrogate. It takes 
pictorial or linguistic form only because some individuals achieve sexual 
gratification by those means. Imagine a person going to a house of prostitu-
136. For a sampling of various theories, see AESTHETICS (H. Osborne ed. 1972). An interesting 
discussion justifying the exclusion of obscenity from legal protection on the basis of the aesthetic theory of 
detachment is found in Kaplan, Obscenity as an Esthetic Catagory, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 544 (1955). 
Kaplan also argues that the distinguishing factor of obscenity (in the pornographic sense) is that it provides 
a stimulus to an experience that is not focused on the material providing the stimulus. Id. at 548. 
137. The term "cognitive" has a philosophical meaning restricting it to the propositional and 
distinguishing it from the emotive. See Frankena, Cognitive and Noncognitive, supra note 131, at 154-63. I 
do not use the word in that technical sense. To react cognitively is to react mentally, or intellectually, not 
necessarily to "know" a proposition. 
138. Many terms in this article are capable of being interpreted in an everyday, legal, or philosophical 
sense. There may not be a solution to this problem, except perhaps the one suggested by Justice Holmes. 
See Holmes, supra note 119. 
139. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (first amendment protects "emotive function" as 
well as "cognitive content"). 
140. It was not until Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), that the Court made it clear that only 
hardcore pornography could be regulated.Id. at 27; see Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1974) 
(further clarification of "patent offensiveness" standard). Had the Court recognized earlier that the Roth 
approach required that regulation be restricted to hardcore pornography, such unfortunate results as 
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), might have been avoided. On the hardcore requirement 
generally, see F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 109·13 (1976). 
141. See references in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), to "erotically arousing," /d, at 
470, "titillation," id., and "sexual stimulation," id. at 471. 
142. See generally D. BARBER, PORNOGRAPHY AND SOCIETY 91 (1972); E. KRONHAUSEN &. P. 
KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 20 (rev. ed. 1964); Burgess, What is Pornography?, in 
PERSPECfiVES ON PORNOGRAPHY 4-8 (D. Hughes ed. 1970); Symposium, Pornography: Attitudes, Use and 
Effects, 29 J. OF Soc. ISSUES No. 3 (1973). 
143. Pornography has been called "a substitute for a sexual partner." Burgess, supra note 142, at 5. 
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tion, and, in accord with his or her particular sexual preferences, requesting 
that two prostitutes engage in sexual activity with each other while he 
becomes aroused. Having achieved sexual satisfaction in this manner, he pays 
his money and leaves, never having touched either of the prostitutes. Imagine 
an individual who asks that a leather-clad prostitute crack a whip within an 
inch of his ear. Are these free speech cases? Hardly.144 Despite the fact that 
eyes and ears are used, these incidents are no more cognitive than any other 
experience with a prostitute. It is essentially a physical activity, the lack of 
actual contact notwithstanding. If the above examples are not free speech 
cases, is there any real difference between the same activity when presented on 
film rather than in the flesh? Consider further rubber, plastic, or leather sex 
aids. It is hard to find any free speech aspects in their sale or use. If 
pornography is viewed merely as a type of aid to sexual satisfaction, any 
distinction between pornography and so-called "rubber products" is mean-
ingless. The mere fact that in pornography the stimulating experience is 
initiated by visual rather than tactile means is irrelevant if every other aspect 
of the experience is the same. Neither means constitutes communication in 
the cognitive sense. Pornography involves neither a communicator nor an 
object of the communication. The purveyor of the pornography is in the 
business solely of providing sexual pleasure; it is unrealistic to presume that 
he is anything but indifferent to the method by which pleasure is provided and 
profit secured.l45. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that the recipient 
desires anything other than sexual stimulation. Hardcore pornography, then, 
is distinguished by its similarity in all relevant respects to a wide range of 
other sexual experiences. 
The point is that the use of pornography may be treated conceptually as a 
purely physical rather than mental experience. This is of course an oversim-
plification. Physical sensations, including sexual arousal, have mental ele-
ments. Is pain physical or mental? Some of both, surely. The same is true of 
physical attributes of sexuality. A helpful illustration of this phenomenon is a 
spectrum, or a range-the intellectual predominates one extreme and the 
physical predominates the other.i46 At the physical extreme of the spectrum 
the conduct possesses so few mental attributes that it has none of the 
characteristics of the intellectual process constituting the core of the constitu-
tional definition of speech. This concept of predominance of the physical is 
the proper meaning of the phrase "no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas."147 To reiterate, the physical must be distinguished from the emotional. 
As Justice Harlan noted in Cohen v. California, 14B the emotive, as well as the 
propositional or cognitive, is implicitly encompassed by the intellectual or 
communicative interpretation of the first amendment.149 The first amendment 
144. Unless, of course, we equate free speech with freedom to engage in arguably self-regarding 
activities, a position I reject. See text accompanying notes 69-81 supra. 
145. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (defendant 
purveyors who openly advertised to appeal to customers' erotic interest "plainly engaged in commercial 
exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials with prurient effect"). 
146. To an extent this illustration parallels Finnis, supra note 4. Finnis points out that the distinction 
commonly drawn between "reason" and "passion" has a sound philosophical and psychological basis. Id. 
at 227-28. 
147. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
148. 403 u.s. 15 (1971). 
149. Id. at 26; see Nimmer, supra note 45, at 34-35. Professor Nimmer represented Cohen before the 
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protects the communication of emotions or the appeal to emotions as much as 
it does the communication of normative or factual propositions. The emotive 
is essentially an intellectual or mental process. Thus the emotive and the 
cognitive are distinguishable from the physical. This is the distinction drawn 
in Cohen between the emotive on the one hand and "psychic stimulation"tso 
on the other. The same distinction is implicit in the Roth-Miller-Paris 
approach to obscenity. Cohen, in telling us what obscenity is not, explains 
legal obscenity better than any of the cases that purport to tell us what 
obscenity is. Once the emotive is included with the propositional, art, music, 
or poetry receive ample constitutional protection. 
It has been suggested, however, that serious literature as well as hardcore 
pornography may evoke this same type of physical or quasi-physical arous-
al.lSl No doubt many people have been aroused by Lady Chatterly's Lover, or 
Tropic of Cancer, and there are people somewhere who are aroused sexually 
by the plays of Shakespeare, by the Kinsey Report, or even by Bambi. People 
may become sexually excited by art or music; it is said that Hitler's speeches 
had the effect of arousing some of his listeners. The argument is that because 
all of the above constitute conduct protected by the flrst amendment, a 
distinction based on the capacity to cause sexual arousal is meaningless. 
This argument misconceives the issue; it fails to recognize that a speech act 
may have multiple effects. Oral speech can have an intellectual effect and can 
have the physical effect of hurting the ears, breaking glass, or causing 
disruption by noise alone. The former is within the flrst amendment; the latter 
is not. The flrst amendment bars neither prohibitions on the use of sound 
trucks152 nor restrictions on talking in libraries.ts3 Books have intellectual 
content as well as physical mass. Although regulating the former is presump-
tively prohibited by the flrst amendment,I54 barring a person from stacking 
two tons of books on a sidewalk is not. Assuming that the purely physical 
stimulus of a picture, book, or magazine is outside the scope of the flrst 
amendment, the result in the case of Lady Chatterly's Lover, Tropic of Cancer, 
or perhaps Bambi, is protected intellectual appeal and effect inseparably 
admixed with physical appeal and effect. The flrst amendment prohibition of 
regulation of commingled intellectual and physical effects is not intended to 
protect the physical but to safeguard the intellectual content. Thus the 
amendment accords far greater importance to the protection of material that 
appeals to the intellectual nature of man than to the police power justifica-
tions for regulating obscenity. Given this constitutional balance of interests, 
the fust amendment nevertheless poses no bar to the regulation of material 
Supreme Court. 
150. 403 U.S. at 20 ("It cannot plausibly be maintained that this vulgar allusion to the Selective Service 
System would conjure up such psychic stimulation in anyone likely to be confronted with Cohen's crudely 
defaced jacket."). "[A]nyone who find's Cohen's jacket 'obscene' or erotic had better have his valves 
checked." Ely, supra note 142. 
151. See BARBER, supra note 142. 
152. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). If the regulation contains no standards, it will be 
invalidated. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). 
153. The example is from Scanlon, supra note 15, at 207; cf. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 138-39, 
142-43 (1966) (state may not punish peaceable and orderly protest of segregation in public library; 
inference that prohibition of breach of peace or boisterous, obstreperous behavior constitutional). 
154. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 118 n.3 (1973) (Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) 
only case since Roth where Court held books obscene and most were illustrated). 
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that has a solely physical content. The sexual stimulus in Lady Chatterley's 
Lover is only a side effect. Lawrence himself, after all, "would censor genuine 
pornography, rigorously."t55 Just as the government can censor noise but not 
a noisy political speech,l56 as it can rigidly control automobile traffic but must 
be more circumspect in regulating parades and demonstrations, so the 
government under the first amendment may censor physical stimulation but 
not mentally oriented art or literature producing physical stimulation. The 
essence of the exclusion of hardcore pornography from the first amendment is 
not that it has a physical effect, but that it has nothing else. 
Similarly, it has been argued that it is impossible to distinguish the 
pornographic from the propositionaJ, to distinguish legal obscenity from 
thematic obscenity, because pornography is implicitly making a statement 
that the depicted activities are desirable or that pornography itself is 
valuable.l57 In short, pornography pleads the case for a different sexual vision, 
opening the mind to a different view of sexual mores.tss But this argument 
proves too much. Almost any activity is itself an argument for its propriety. 
Chomsky has shown that all action is communicative.t59 An assassination of 
the President is at once a violent act and a political statement.l60 Pollution by 
a steel company is simultaneously an act and a statement that pollution is the 
necessary price of economic growth. Running down Main Street naked may 
be a statement about sexual values or an appeal for casting off our sexual 
inhibitions by doffing our clothes. But implicit in any meaningful constitu-
tional defmition of speech as communication is the idea that one can separate 
advocacy of an act from the act itself, even though the act contains an element 
of advocacy. 
This is the distinction that is essential to an understanding of the holding in 
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.l6l There 
is a difference between arguing in favor of discrimination and discriminat-
ing.t62 Likewise there is a distinction between arguing for a new sexual vision 
and embodying it. Arguments for revolution are protected-revolution is 
155. D.H. LAWRENCE, Pornography and Obscenity, in SEX, LITERATURE, AND CENSORSHIP 64, 69 (H. 
Moore ed. 1959). 
156. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 
(1949); cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (some offense to members of the 
public does not justify restricting speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (distinguishing 
between visual and aural offense; viewer can avert his eyes, listener cannot so easily protect his 
sensibilities). 
157. See Richards, supra note 69, at 81-82. 
158. For a judicial rejection of such an argument under current obscenity standards, see United States v. 
One Reel of Film, 481 F.2d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 1973). 
159. See J. LYONS, CHOMSKY (2d. ed. 1977). 
160. See Scanlon, supra note 15, at 206. 
161. 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding ban on newspaper listing employment openings according to sexual 
classifications). 
162. I d. at 391. Scanlon makes the same point by noting that there should be no bar to the prosecution of 
someone who discovers and publishes a recipe for making nerve gas out of gasoline, table salt, and urine. 
Scanlon, supra note 15, at 211 ("[H]e could be prohibited by law from passing out his recipe on handbills or 
broadcasting it on television as ••• he could be prohibited from passing out free samples of his product in 
aerosol cans or putting it on sale at Abercrombie & Fitch."). 
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not.l63 Arguments for sex are protectedl64-sex is not.t6s Sex in and of itself is 
not protected by the first amendment. If sex is not protected, then two-
dimensional sex is protected no more than three-dimensional sex, visual sex 
no more than tactile sex. Underlying all of the words of Roth, Miller, and 
Paris is the assumption that hardcore pornography is sex. The relevant 
precedent is not Schenck v. United States,t66 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 167 
or Kingsley Pictures v. Regents;t6s it is Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.l69 
And it is this conception of pornography as action, pornography as physical, 
that rationalizes the exclusion of pornography from the protection of the first 
amendment. 
As I have previously suggested, the Court has experienced difficulty in 
articulating the concept of pornography as non-speech. The historical 
discussion in Roth110 is perhaps its least successful attempt. The fact that some 
forms of obscenity were prohibited in colonial America is largely irrelevant to 
a meaningful, contemporary conception of constitutional "speech." Blasphe-
my was a criminal offense, as was political libel, but that is of little moment in 
1979.171 Moreover, obscenity in 1791 was a far more encompassing term than 
it is today.l12 Although anyone can cite constitutional history and the 
scriptures to his purpose, 173 historical analysis should not be completely 
discounted. At a minimum it demonstrates that the constitutional meaning of 
163. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 296-98 (1961) (distinguishes between advocacy and 
instigation of forcible overthrow of government); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961) 
(same); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312-27(1957) (same); cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
447-49 (1969) (state may proscribe incitement of "imminent lawless action"). 
164. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959) ("What New York has 
done, therefore, is to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture advocates an 
idea-that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior. Yet the First Amendment's basic 
quarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas. • . . It protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may 
sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax.") 
165. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (mem.) (affirming 403 F. Supp. 1199, 
1200, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975) (upholding state prohibition on homosexual relations); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 
F.2d 349, 351-52 (4th Cir. 1976) (constitutional protection denied to married couple who invited stranger 
to observe and take part in their sexual activities), cert denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1977); cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (assuming permissibility of antifornication statute). But see L. TRIBE, supra note 4 at 
941-48. 
166. 249 u.s. 47 (1919). 
167. 315 u.s. 568 (1942). 
168. 360 u.s. 684 (1960). 
169. 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (mem.) (affirming 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975)). My argument that the 
true issue in the regulation ofhardcore pornography is not free speech but personal liberty follows, to some 
extent, Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963). 
170. 354 U.S. at 482-84 (Court reviewed colonial laws and intent of Continental Congress; amendment 
intended to guarantee uninhibited expression of political ideas; libel and obscenity not protected because 
did not achieve that purpose). 
171. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (Constitution denies recovery by 
public official for defamation or libel unless he can prove "actual malice"; standard protects public 
criticism); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1952) (impermissible under first and 
fourteenth amendments for state to censor motion pictures on grounds they are "sacrilegious"). 
172. See generally F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 8-29 (1976). In many cases, courts were 
unwilling, in the interests of dignity, to discuss the details of the cases before them. I d. at 11. Furthermore, 
the few opinions that discussed the charges involved prosecutions for publication of works dealing with 
sexual intercourse and venereal disease, words no longer considered profane. Id. at 12. 
173. Cf. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, Act I, scene 2, line 98-99 ("Mark you this 
Bassanio, I The Devil can cite Scripture for his purpose."). 
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"speech" has never coincided with the ordinary meaning of "speech."I74 The 
Roth opinion relies too heavily on the historical treatment of obscenity; that 
treatment is but one example of the proposition that "the unconditional 
phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every 
utterance."I75 But, as I have suggested in the first part of this article,I76 the 
latter is an argument better made philosophically than historically. 
The phrases "social value"I77 and "social importance"I78 are as fundamen-
tally misleading as the historical inquiry. Of course pornography can have 
social value.l79 So can pollution, sex, political assassination, twelve-hour days, 
small children working at sewing machines, long hair, or short skirts. The 
issue is not whether the activity has social value, but whether it is speech. It is 
speech in the constitutional sense if and only if it has a certain kind of value: 
value as the process and result of intellectual communication. There are many 
other kinds of value, but this is the only one protected by the first amendment. 
The first amendment is not and cannot be the guardian of everything that is 
valuable, and value per se does not give rise to first amendment protection. 
Justice Brennan's statement that obscenity was without social impor-
tance180 was mistaken on two counts. First, he assumed that anything without 
value as speech must be without value. Second, he thereby invited anyone who 
could show that obscenity did possess social value, regardless of first 
amendment value, to challenge directly the analytical underpinnings of the 
Roth methodology. If the Court in Roth had distinguished communicative 
value from other sorts of value, it would have established a foundation for 
isolating "speech" from other forms of conduct. The Court attempted to 
salvage the Roth rationale in Paris Adult Theatres I by observing that the 
control of obscenity "is distinct from a· control of reason and the intellect,"ISI 
by focusing on the "communication of ideas,"I82 by excluding free will or 
social laissez-faire as constitutional values, 183 and by observing that "the 
fantasies of a drug addict are his own and beyond the reach of government, 
but government regulation of drug sales is not prohibited by the Constitu-
tion."I84 Both Paris and Miller, however, relied too heavily on the language in 
174. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 483. 
175. Id. Other examples include blasphemy, profanity, and libel. 
176.See text accompanying notes 66-117 supra. 
177. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,418-19 (1966) (literature possessing minimal "social 
value" not obscene even if appealing to the prurient and patently offensive to average member of society 
based on contemporary community standards). 
178. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 484 (all ideas of "social importance" deserve full 
constitutional protection); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (Brennan, J.) (inappropriate to 
balance appeal to prurient interest and "social importance"; any social importance guarantees protection 
under Roth). 
179. Two interesting collections outlining various uses and misuses of obscenity are R. DHAVAN & C. 
DAVIES, CENSORSHIP AND OBSCENITY (1978) and D. HUGHES, PERSPECTIVES ON PORNOGRAPHY 
(1970). 
180. See note 178 supra. 
181. 413 U.S. at 67. 
182. Id. (incidental interference with "communication of ideas" not prohibited by first amendment). 
183. Id. at 64. 
184. Id. at 67-68. The Court in Paris undermines its own position by engaging in unnecessary 
justification for obscenity regulation. If its purpose was only to define the parameters of constitutional 
speech, and if hardcore pornography falls outside those parameters as well as outside the protection of any 
other constitutional provision, the state need show only a rational basis. A footnote would have been more 
than sufficient. See Hindes, supra note 78, at 353-54 & n.38. 
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Roth and, more significantly, on the definition of obscenity thereafter 
developed. The role of the defmition of obscenity in promoting the distinction 
suggested here and implicit in Roth is critical, and must be evaluated in light 
of the purposes the defmition is designed to serve. 
IV. THE DEFINITION OF "OBSCENITY" 
The fundamental premise of this article is that certain verbal or pictorial 
materials are not speech in the constitutional sense. Because most verbal or 
pictorial materials do possess intellectual content, the purpose of a legal 
definition of obscenity must be to separate those that do not possess such 
content from those that do.tss Like "speech," "obscenity" is a term of art that 
derives its meaning from its purpose-the essential separating function,1B6 
Once "obscenity" is confmed to non-speech, as set forth in Roth, the 
distinction between legal obscenity and ordinary obscenity becomes appar-
ent,187 Ordinary obscenity includes four-letter words and sexually explicit or 
offensive material having cognitive content. The purpose of the legal or 
constitutional defmition of obscenity is to isolate that which lacks cognitive or 
intellectual content and not to describe certain forms of expression or 
communication. 
Having established that the separating function is the purpose of the 
definition of obscenity, the true meaning of "appea[l] to the prurient 
interest" ISS becomes apparent. Material which appeals to the prurient interest 
is intended to, and does in fact, produce a physical or quasi-physical stimulus 
rather than a mental effect,189 The Court's opinion in Roth is curiously 
inconsistent because it suggests that "speech" has a constitutional meaning 
apart from its ordinary meaning, but that the definition of "prurient" can be 
obtained by looking in the dictionary.190 The dictionary definitions should not 
be determinative, but they do suggest that it is the physical or arousing 
characteristics that are essential to the exclusion of "obscenity" from the first 
amendment.t9t The concept fundamental to the Miller test is that material 
appealing to the prurient interest is sex, and not merely describing or 
advocating sex. Material that appeals to the prurient interest is material that 
turns you on. Period. 
Some literature, art, or other protected speech may also turn people on 
physically;t92 the last prong of the test is designed to restrict legal obscenity to 
185. See Schauer, Reflections on "Contemporary Community Standards": The Perpetuation of an 
Irrelevant Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 56 N. CAR. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1978) (definition of obscenity 
permits court to "separate" materials protected by constitution from those which are not). To determine 
whether regulation is permissible it is fJISt necessary to decide on a definition and then to ascertain whether 
the material falls within the scope of the definition. Id. 
186. The need to distinguish dictates that the Court establish a definition to use as its standard. I d. at 4· 
5. 
187. See notes 119 & 134 supra. 
188. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) 
and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). 
189. See Schauer, supra note 185, at 14-17 (noncognitive material having physical effect and appealing 
to prurient interest classified as conduct rather than speech). 
190. 354 U.S. at 487 n.20. Not only are the Roth definitions largely irrelevant, they are at times 
inconsistent with each other. 
191. See Schauer, supra note 185, at 14-17. 
192. See text accompanying notes 151-56supra. 
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that material which possesses only physical attributes, and is a necessary 
adjunct to the inherently overinclusive prurient interest test. The two tests 
operate to identify that which is solely physical. The "utterly without 
redeeming social value" test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts193 recognized the 
need to isolate the purely physical, but by using the criterion of social value it 
unnecessarily restricted state power, for reasons that I have discussed 
previously.l94 The Court in Miller erroneously concluded that both the 
"utterly" and the "social value" tests of Memoirs were unnecessarily strict.t95 
Although that was true of the "social value" criterion, it was not true of the 
"utterly" prong. The latter serves to exclude anything cognitive and thus 
serves to distinguish speech and non-speech. As Justice Brennan suggested in 
his Paris dissent, removal of the word "utterly" was inconsistent with the 
analytic underpinnings of Roth)96 
A more appropriate test would be "utterly without literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value," or, better still, "utterly without intellectually 
communicative content." If the word "serious" is to remain, it must be 
defined in terms of intent alone, a point I have made previously.197 So defmed, 
it serves only to exclude the case of "[a] quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf 
of . . . an otherwise obscene publication.''t9s But if the word "serious" is 
interpreted to allow jury or court evaluation of the worth of cognitive 
communication, then it is totally at odds both with the non-speech methodol-
ogy and the philosophy of the first amendment. 
I have reserved discussion of the second prong of the Miller test, patent 
offensiveness, because by now it should be clear that it serves no purpose in 
the defmitional methodology. If the prurient interest test isolates material 
that has physical as opposed to mental effect, and if the "value" test restricts 
regulation to material that is solely physical in nature, what is left is not 
speech in the constitutional sense, regardless of whether anyone is offended, 
and regardless of whether any community's standards are affronted. This test 
is inconsistent with the underlying premise of Roth, Miller, and Paris. By 
including "offensiveness" within the defmition of obscenity, the Court 
suggests that offensiveness has a role in the determination of whether material 
constitutes speech. Protected speech is often offensive, 199 and in other 
193. 383 U.S. 413, 418-19 (1966) (unless book can be found to be "utterly without social value," it is 
protected by first amendment). 
194. See text accompanying notes 177-81 supra. The concept of "social importance" was criticized by 
Justice White in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 462 (White, J., dissenting) ("social importance" 
not sole factor in banning material but part of constitutional test of protection; prohibition is affirmative act 
of state legislature, whose judgment determines social importance), and was rejected as "ambiguous" in 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 25 n.7 (same). 
195. 413 U.S. at 24-25 . 
. 196. 413 U.S. at 96 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (modification of this aspect of the Memoirs test "may prove 
sufficient to jeopardize the analytic underpinnings of the entire scheme."). 
197. F. SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 140-41 (1976) (requirement that value be serious determines whether 
material is intended to convey literary, artistic, political, or scientific message). Dean Lockhart concurs in 
this interpretation. Lockhart, Book Review, 28 HAsTINGS L.J. 1325, 1327 (1977). 
198. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972). 
199. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1975) (to prohibit showing of drive-in 
movies containing nudity too extreme and may inhibit showing of "innocent" or "educational" films; 
privacy can be protected by averting one's eyes); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971) (mere 
display of "Fuck the Draft" on a jacket in courthouse offensive, but risk of stifling ideas too great; conduct 
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contexts the Court has never suggested that offensiveness is relevant to the 
extent of first amendment protection.2oo Offensiveness has nothing to do with 
whether an utterance is speech in the constitutional sense, and thus is not 
properly part of a defmition whose sole purpose is to separate speech from 
non-speech. 2o1 
The purpose of the definition of obscenity, therefore, is the isolation of 
material devoid of intellectually communicative content. The requirement 
that the material be hardcore pomography202 is but a check on the process;203 
only hardcore pornography could survive the proper application of the first 
and third prongs of the Miller test. The test must ultimately be evaluated in 
terms of the results. Does it work? The Miller test appears to have worked204 
after Jenkins v. Georgia2os made it clear that "community standards" were a 
minor factor in the determination of obscenity.2o6 
Although the Miller formulation has been attacked as inherently too vague, 
the criticism has been on the grounds of practicality-that the test is 
incapable of principled application-and not that it lacks constitutional 
validity. This is essentially Justice Brennan's argument in his dissents in Paris 
and Miller.2o1 Justice Brennan recognized that as long as the first amendment 
does not create a right of individuality per se, the non-speech approach 
remains intellectually defensible.2os His criticism was limited to the claim that 
protected under first and fourteenth amendments). There is, however, some question as to the extent to 
which these holdings survive FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3039, 304041 (1978) (ease with 
which child might listen to broadcast justifies special regulation). By relying on the degree of intrusiveness 
of the medium, the Court has cast a cloud on both Cohen and Erznoznik, since it seems as easy if not easier 
to turn off a radio or a television as it is to divert one's eyes from a jacket in a courthouse lobby or a motion 
picture screen that can be seen from a highway. It may be that the assumption that offensiveness is relevant 
to speech value led to the unfortunate result in Pacifica. 
200. But see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. at 304041 (offensive speech can be prohibited from 
airwaves when special facts render it unwarranted nuisance). The Pacifica holding may have implications 
beyond the regulation of the broadcast media. 
201. See generally Schauer, supra note 185, at 17-21 (offensiveness of language not relevant or reliable 
determinant of constitutional protection). 
202. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 27 (no one subject to prosecution unless materials "patently 
offensive 'hardcore' sexual conduct"). 
203. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 109-13 (1976) (hardcore requirement works as check on court; 
guarantees that material not protected by first amendment). 
204. This judgment is made negatively,:after noting that only hardcore pornography is the subject of 
current prosecutions and convictions. The few attempted convictions of "softer" material have not 
survived appellate review. 
205. 418 u.s. 153 (1974). 
206. I d. at 159·61 ("Carnal Knowledge" not patently offensive and Miller does not place it outside scope 
of first amendment; community standards, although relevant, are subsidiary factor). 
207. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (one cannot bring stability 
to constitutional doctrines of obscenity without sacrificing basic protections of first amendment); Miller v, 
California, 413 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (statute imposes criminal penalty on distributor of 
obscene material; criterion overbroad). Justice Brennan went on to state: 
[A]fter 16 years of experimentation and debate I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that 
none of the available formulas, including the one announced today, can reduce the vagueness 
to a tolerable level while at the same time striking an acceptable balance between the 
protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on the one hand, and on the other the 
asserted state interest in regulating the dissemination of certain sexually oriented materials. 
ld. at 84. 
208. 413 U.S. at 85 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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if this theoretically valid approach does not work in practice it should be 
abandoned. This is certainly a legitimate argument. If there is a substantial 
risk that the test will suppress or chill speech, the interests in obscenity 
regulation must give way to the interest in protecting speech. Moreover, the 
inability of government to make difficult distinctions between obscene and 
protected verbal or pictorial activity provides an independent justification for 
expanding the constitutional definition of speech at the fringe.2o9 Justice 
Brennan's dissent must be taken more seriously than it was by the majority, 
because it properly recognizes the uncertainty inherent in the process and the 
practical results of that uncertainty. 
Justice Brennan failed to recognize, however, that unconstitutional chill-
ing2IO occurs only when the chilled material is itself material worth protecting. 
It is clear that the Miller test will cause some chilling. But what is it that is 
chilled? The division between speech and non-speech is somewhere between 
the two extremes of a continuum of intellectual content, ranging from 
political argument on the one end and a close-up photograph of an ejaculating 
male sexual organ (EMSO) shown solely for the purpose of stimulating a 
similar reaction on the other. 
political speech EMSO 
speech non-speech 
Justice Brennan erroneously assumes that the Miller division is congruent 
with the speech/non-speech demarcation. By adding the specificity require-
ment,m a special scienter requirement,212 and the requirement that material 
be patently offensive to contemporary community standards,213 we have in 
fact moved the actual definition to the right of the division between speech 
and non-speech. 
political speech 
(A) 
Miller 
(B) 
speech non-speech 
EMSO 
(C) 
Thus, the material in area (B), which is not speech, is nevertheless 
protected under the Miller deftnition.2I4 If Miller remains vague and some 
209. See note 66 supra. 
210. The argument that follows is an abbreviated version of a point I made at greater length in the 
context of a fuller exploration of the concept of uncertainty and chilling in first amendment analysis. 
Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978). 
211. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24 (obscene material must portray "sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law"). This factor has little bite today. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 
771-73 (1977) (prior state court decisions may specify types of material that law considers obscene; specific 
statutory definition unnecessary). 
212. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119-24 (1975) (must be aware of contents of material, 
knowledge that material obscene not required); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959) 
(prosecution of bookseller without knowledge of book's contents for possession of book containing 
materials subsequently held obscene impermissible; conviction would hamper freedom of press). Thus, it is 
no longer required that the defendant be shown to have known that the materials were legally obscene. 
213. 413 U.S. at 24. Thus, the patent offensiveness requirement may serve the solely pragmatic function 
of making it more difficult to prove that material is legally obscene. 
214. However, this may be material of the type held subject to regulation in Young v. American Mini 
932 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:899 
material in area (B) is subjected to regulation, no harm is done. In any event, 
an ideal separating function would subject the material in area (B) to state 
control. Unless Mr. Justice Brennan can show that the test is so vague as to 
have a chilling effect on area (A), his warning is unfounded. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Careful attention to the context and purpose of constitutional language 
produces a definition of speech that legitimates the Court's refusal to accord 
first amendment protection to hardcore pornography. This definition reveals 
that "obscenity" in the constitutional sense can be isolated in a category of 
non-speech that does not possess first amendment value. This is not to say 
that the conception of the first amendment underlying this definition is 
necessarily correct; that judgment requires more critical examination.21s 
Rather, it is significant that the Court's treatment of obscenity is consistent 
with a vision that emphasizes intellectual (and perhaps public) communica-
tion and not self-expression. If the Court is to be criticized, it must be for that 
conception of the first amendment and not for the approach to obscenity that 
flows naturally from it. 
The Court's treatment of pornography is easily justified, particularly since 
pornography is almost wholly pictorial. Pictures, after all, are not mentioned 
in the first amendment. Most pictures come within the purview of the first 
amendment because they are similar in relevant respects to linguistic 
communication. When these similarities are not present, there is no reason to 
extend the first amendment in this manner. Pornography is in this sense at the 
"fringe" of the amendment's protection. Those who take a literal approach to 
the constitution should not worry about the Court's pornography rulings. 
They should be concerned about the treatment of verbal betting, bigamy, 
price-fixing, and the truthful advertisement of unregistered securities, all of 
which inevitably involve the use of words. 
Distinguishing between speech and non-speech is a constitutional function. 
The legislative or regulatory function is to identify a particular harm. 
Difficulty arises because many of the legislatively perceived harms flowing 
from obscenity are present in speech as well as non-speech. Obscenity may 
offend, degrade the environment, or cause antisocial conduct,216 The same 
damage may in most instances be caused by sexually explicit speech as well as 
by pornographic non-speech. In drawing the constitutional line, the Supreme 
Court has placed it somewhere in the middle of the area of legitimate 
legislative concern. Often a legislature cannot deal with an entire class of 
harm without infringing upon speech as well as non-speech. It cannot regulate 
speech without making a far greater showing of need than is currently 
available on the evidence.217 The effect of the first amendment, therefore, is to 
limit the legislative bodies to regulating only part of a problem. 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 54, 62-64 (1976) (zoning ordinance prohibiting location of adult bookstores 
and theaters within 1000 feet of other such establishments valid exercise of police power and not prior 
restraint on speech). 
215. See note 68 supra. 
216. 413 U.S. at 58-61 & n.8 (obscenity has been found to correlate with crime; its existence arguably 
degrades level of decent society and invades right of privacy of those who wish to but cannot avoid it). 
217. See generally Richards, supra note 69. 
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The latter proposition in itself is not startling. If a city council wants quiet 
parks it can keep out trucks but not speeches, both of which cause noise but 
only one of which is outside the scope of first amendment protection. But the 
problem here is that any constitutionally drawn legislation will be largely 
futile. A legislature restricted solely to dealing with non-speech may be 
doomed to failure in tryirig to make society safer, more moral, less subject to 
offense, or more pleasant. Yet no other solution is possible. Ultimately the 
legislative goals must yield to the first amendment. In the interest of 
maximum first amendment protection, the Court has doomed the legislature 
to largely ineffective measures. I would suggest that faced with this reality the 
legislature should refrain from regulation. But this is a legislative and not a 
constitutional choice. The Constitution properly limits the legislature to what 
may seem an artillcially constrained area. What remains to be regulated is not 
a constitutional concern. 

